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Introduction
OVER THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS, the payday lending industry has
grown exponentially from 300 locations in the United States in the
early 1990s, to 10,000 locations in 2000, and to 22,000 locations as
recently as 2003.' Driven by an increased number of families with im-
paired credit, the industry has become an integral part of low- and
moderate-income banking.2 Consumer advocates describe payday
lenders as preying on the least well-off in society by creating cycles of
debt wherein consumers must continually take out more payday loans
to pay off previous loans, thus preventing asset building by those who
most need to save.3 The payday lending industry responds to these
criticisms with a number of arguments that are difficult to dispute:
payday lenders are providing a highly-desired service; the industry re-
ceives high rates of customer satisfaction; and their "best practices"-
along with many state laws-do not permit people to enter into so-
called cycles of debt.4
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Payday loans are short-term, high-cost loans where the borrower
provides either a post-dated check or allows access to a debit account
in return for immediate cash, with the promise that the customer will
pay back the full amount plus a fee. 5 If the customer uses a check, the
amount on the check must cover both the cash advance and the fee
for using the payday loan. 6 The fee on a payday loan is usually
15-20% of the base amount, or, as it is usually advertised, $15 or $20
per $100 borrowed. 7 This translates, at the $15 per $100 rate, to an
annual percentage rate ("APR") of 390%.8 Applying for a loan re-
quires only a driver's license, pay stub, bank statement, telephone bill,
and checkbook, and the application process only takes a few minutes.9
The loans are usually due in two weeks, although time periods vary, to
correspond with a person's paycheck. 10 When the loan is due, the con-
sumer has the option of allowing the payday lender to cash the post-
dated check, buying the check back from the lender for the amount
on the check, or doing a "rollover" or "renewal" by paying another
finance charge. 1 Lenders refuse to accept partial payments for the
principal amount of the payday loans, so customers often need to re-
new the loans repeatedly until they are able to save enough in order
to pay off the entire loan.' 2
Neutral observers find that the tendency of payday loans to lead
to repeat borrowing is the most significant problem with the prod-
Practices]; Consumer Fin. Servs. Ass'n of Am., Myth vs. Reality of Payday Loans, http://
www.cfsa.net/myth-vs-reality.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Myth vs. Reality].
5. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 9-10 (2002).
6. Id.
7. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 2.
8. DONALD MORGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORTS No. 273, DEFINING
AND DETECTING PREDATORY LENDING 5 (2007). According to the Consumer Federation of
America, this is the most common rate for payday loans, although in a study done by con-
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FED'N OF AM., SHOW ME THE MONEY: A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF PAYDAY
LENDER LOBBYING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 7 (2000), available at http://www.uspirg.org/
uploads/0J/JI/0JJIxjolTQlIpsOOhaP -dg/showmethemoneyfinal.PDF. The value of judg-
ing payday loans based on the APR is hotly contested by the industry, considering that
these are annual rates and the loan is only supposed to be for two weeks. Many customers,
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cost.
9. Johnson, supra note 5.
10. Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv.
723, 724-25.
11. Id.; Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of Colorado's
Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENY. U. L. REv. 387, 389-91 (2005).
12. Johnson, supra note 5, at 11.
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uct. 13 In fact, federal regulators have turned against the industry in
recent years primarily on this ground.1 4 The industry has made some
attempts to self-regulate the problem of renewals of payday loans, and
many state governments that do not prohibit payday lending outright
regulate the industry in an attempt to minimize repeat borrowing. 15
Payday lenders, however, whose profits depend on repeat usage and
customers who want or need to take out multiple loans, have found
ways to circumvent state regulations that aim to limit the number of
loans a person can have in a given amount of time. 16 While banning
payday loans would certainly eliminate this problem-and Congress
recently passed a law effectively doing that for members of the armed
forcesl7-most states have chosen instead to regulate the loans. Yet,
state regulation has not limited people's ability to engage in self-de-
structive uses of payday loans. A number of banks and credit unions
have attempted to compete with payday lenders by offering products
at terms that are less likely to lead to repeat borrowing. Most of these
efforts however, have failed.18 Either they attracted few customers be-
cause they do not provide the convenience of payday loans, or they
ended up supplementing an individual's collection of payday loans.19
13. See infra Part I.
14. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, ANALYSIS OF FDIC's REVISED EXAMINATION GuI-
DANCE FOR PAYDAY LENDING PROGRAMS (2005) [hereinafter CRL 2005], available at http://
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ing how two payday lenders were fined for regularly going over the $700 limit for loans by
offering multiple loans to the same customers, giving individual customers thousands of
dollars in high interest rate debt).
17. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)).
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.
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Instead of supporting these unsuccessful attempts to respond to
payday loans, this Article argues that banks, which face both regula-
tory and public pressures to maintain good practices, should be "in-
vited" to take over the industry. Banks can not only offer lower interest
rates than payday lenders, but they can also place limitations on the
use of payday loans that discourage repeat borrowing without sacrific-
ing the convenience that attracts customers to payday loans.
Banks will be easier to regulate and monitor than payday lenders.
APR limits can be set at lower levels than payday lenders currently
offer, and consumers can have longer to pay back such loans, thereby
limiting the problem of rollovers and borrowing from multiple lend-
ers. In order to effectively take over the payday lending industry, how-
ever, both federal and state regulators, with the support of consumer
advocates, need to loosen the reins on banks to incentivize them to
offer payday loans and give consumers a reason to use the banks in-
stead of current payday lenders. While this is not the ideal solution
for consumer advocates, as state regulation of the industry and com-
peting products .offered by banks and credit unions have largely
failed, a change in the supplier of payday loans, along with changes in
the regulatory regime, is the best method for limiting the excesses of
the product.
Part I describes the payday lending industry and examines the
most significant debate over its use: whether the problem of rollovers
makes it a dangerous product or whether satisfied customers should
be allowed to make their own financial decisions. Part II discusses the
legal status of payday lending, including the changes in federal regula-
tions, the recent law to ban payday loans to active United States ser-
vice members, and state attempts at regulation. Part III summarizes
the available data regarding the business of payday lending at the indi-
vidual store level. Part IV evaluates the potential alternatives to miti-
gate the effects of payday loans, including emphasizing the
Community Reinvestment Act,20 credit unions and banks offering
competing products, and strengthening enforcement of state regula-
tions. Part V poses the possibility of changing the supplier of payday
loans to reputable national banks, and explains why banks have
avoided payday lending but why it could work. Finally, Part VI dis-
cusses financial and political obstacles facing such a proposal.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2000).
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I. The Industry of Payday Lending and its Proper Use
A. Growth of the Industry
The payday lending industry did not exist twenty years ago, yet
today, as many payday lenders as McDonald's and Starbucks com-
bined operate in the United States. 21 A number of factors have con-
tributed to the industry's rapid growth, but the primary reason is the
deregulation of the banking industry in the 1970s and 80s.22 Once
banks no longer had to offer "money-losing" services, such as small
loans, they quickly focused on larger loans with greater profits. 23 This
forced customers with short-term credit needs to go to payday lenders
and other financial service providers aimed at the poor.2 4 Around the
same time, the Federal Reserve Board significantly raised interest rates
to combat inflation, and states relaxed interest rate caps to allow
banks to remain profitable at rates in conformity with the law; some
states went so far as to eliminate their interest rate caps entirely. 25
States also made exceptions to interest rate restrictions for rent-to-own
stores and pawnshops, foreshadowing future legislative initiatives to
relax interest rate caps for payday lenders. 26
More recently, check cashers, who had fewer checks to cash due
to the rise in direct deposit transactions, needed a new business
model. While state legislatures continued to make exceptions to state
usury laws, paycheck cashers started offering payday loans and per-
suaded state legislatures to create another exemption. 27 As this Article
discusses in Part II, as many as thirty-nine states currently allow payday
lending by either exempting payday lenders from state usury laws or
by not having an interest rate cap. The industry also once benefited,
when the practice was legal, from the "rent-a-bank" phenomenon,
where banks from states with no interest rate caps could export those
21. Sue Kirchhoff, Breaking the Cycle of Payday Loan 'Trap, USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 2006,
at BI.
22. Chin, supra note 10, at 727; Scott Andrew Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regula-
tion of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 340 (2001).
23. Chin, supa note 10, at 727. The sunk costs for large loans and small loans are the
same for a legitimate bank that has to verify a customer's financial information before
offering a loan, so the profits are much higher on a loan worth thousands of dollars com-
pared to a loan worth hundreds. Id.
24. Id.
25. Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The
Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 672 (2005).
26. Id.
27. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 8.
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rates to other states by working with a local payday lender.28 State leg-
islative assistance, in combination with the growing number of people
with impaired credit who could not turn to banks or credit cards for
short-term credit needs, caused the payday lending industry to
boom. 29
B. Who Uses Payday Loans?
The question of who payday lending customers are, primarily re-
garding their income levels and borrowing characteristics, is in dis-
pute between consumer advocates and the payday lending industry.
An industry under constant scrutiny does not want to appear to be
taking advantage of a vulnerable customer base. Instead, the industry
describes its customers as middle-income consumers who need short-
term credit for a temporary problem.3 0 As one participant in a forum
on payday lending described the industry's view: "They say their cus-
tomers are solidly middle class and don't need 'protection.' In short,
leave them alone."31 One academic study sponsored in part by the
payday lending industry provides the best support for the contention
that payday lending customers are solidly middle class or soon-to-be
middle-class individuals. 32 The study concluded that over half of cus-
tomers have incomes between $25,000 and $50,000 per year, which is
higher than the percentage of adults in the general population mak-
ing this amount.33 Approximately a quarter of customers make less
than $25,000, and about a quarter make more than $50,000.34 Payday
advance customers are also more likely than the general population to
be in what the authors describe as "early life-cycle stages" with fewer
accumulated assets and less access to credit.3 5
The study on income, however, is an outlier. Many states main-
tain their own data that shows the average income of customers is be-
tween $20,000 and $30,000 per year. 36 The average incomes vary from
28. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 705. The rent-a-bank phenomenon and the
recent regulatory crackdown are described in Part II.
29. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 8.
30. NEFE, supra note 3.
31. Id.
32. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 28-29.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 30-32. This study found that almost three-fifths of customers have children
and the single largest group of customers are those under thirty-five years of age. Id.
36. Indiana reports that average incomes for borrowers are between $25,000 and
$30,000; Illinois reports $24,000; Wisconsin reports $19,000. Stegman & Fais, supra note 2,
at 15. The average income in Colorado is $28,440. Chessin, supra note 11, at 405. Finally, a
[Vol. 42
PAYDAY LENDING
state to state and from year to year, but they are consistently closer to
$25,000 than $50,000 per year.
Furthermore, consumers who use payday loans are more likely to
have faced credit rejection and to have used credit counseling. 37 Ac-
cording to the industry-sponsored study, customers are three times as
likely to have been rejected for credit and four times as likely to have
filed for bankruptcy compared to the average consumer.38 Comparing
payday loan customers to the larger population instead of people with
similar incomes may not be the most helpful indicator of their finan-
cial vulnerability, but payday loan customers are certainly credit con-
strained and may not believe they have other options for obtaining
credit based on their prior experiences seeking credit.3 9
C. The Critique of the Cost of Payday Loans: Trapping People in
Cycles of Debt
The payday lending industry portrays its product as a "financial
taxi" that ushers its users though a rough financial stretch by provid-
ing immediate cash. 40 As the analogy implies, payday loans are meant
to provide a fix to a temporary problem, just as a taxi provides occa-
sional use of a car. The vast majority of consumers, however, do not
use payday loans as a temporary fix to manage a single crisis.41 The
habit of continually depending on payday loans creates "cycles of
debt" that consumer advocates decry.42
The statistics on frequency of use of payday loans demonstrate
that payday loans are not used just for emergencies, but become a
regular part of most borrowers' lives. When payday loans began, and
there was no direct regulation of the industry, consumers easily be-
came stuck in cycles of debt. When a person could not afford to pay
back the full amount of his or her payday loan, he or she could simply
consumer union study calculated average income to be $25,417 in California. Johnson,
supra note 5, at 99. The article on Colorado also offers more demographic information
about Colorado borrowers: average age is thirty-six, while almost two-thirds of borrowers
are between twenty and thirty-nine, women are about 55% of borrowers, and almost 53%
of borrowers were single. More than half of borrowers' occupations were classified as ei-
ther "laborer" or "office," each making about $2200 per month. Chessin, supra note 11, at
405-07.
37. NEFE, supra note 3; Stegman & Fais, supra note 2, at 18.
38. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 45-46.
39. Id.
40. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass'n of America, About the Payday Advance Serice, http://
www.cfsa.net/aboutpayday-advance-product.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
41. See infra Part I.C.
42. See infra Part I.C.
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pay the finance charge again, thus rolling over the loan.4 3 For exam-
ple, if a borrower took out a $300 loan, but could not pay the $345
normally required by his or her next payday, he or she could pay a $45
fee and "rollover" or "renew" the loan until the next payday. The cus-
tomer could also take out another loan for the $345 plus a 15% fee,
using the $345 to pay off the previous debt. Testimony at a 1999 fo-
rum on payday loans that Senator Joseph Lieberman convened of-
fered examples of this practice at its worst. One borrower took out a
$150 loan and paid $1000 in fees over six months without ever affect-
ing the principal. 44 Recent restrictions on rollovers and direct renew-
als, however, both imposed by the industry and enacted by state and
federal governments, limit the usefulness of focusing simply on direct
renewals of loans as an accurate measurement of the pitfalls of the
product.
According to a recent study of state regulator data, the average
borrower takes out approximately nine payday loans per year, indebt-
ing the borrower to a payday lender for eighteen weeks, or approxi-
mately one-third of the year. 45 According to the Center for
Responsible Lending, 91% of payday loans are made to borrowers
with at least five payday loans per year. 46 Also, two in three borrowers
take out at least five payday loans per year, and almost one in three
borrowers take out twelve or more each year. 47 Most importantly, if
customers use payday loans that frequently, the industry's argument
that APRs of 300% or 400% are not relevant in judging the fairness of
the product is not persuasive. As Jean Fox, the director of consumer
43. Chin, supra note 10, at 729.
44. Id. While situations like this are easy to find in newspaper accounts of payday
lending, this Article does not focus on the examples of payday lending gone wrong be-
cause it is not at all clear that they are representative of the use of the product in general.
After all, many people have serious problems with credit card debt, but no one wants to
abolish credit cards entirely. However, the data is clear about the majority of customers'
frequent usage of payday loans.
45. URLAH KING ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FINANCIAL QUICKSAND: PAYDAY
LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 7
(2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr012-Financial-Quicksand-
1106.pdf. This study included California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vir-
ginia, and Washington. Some earlier data focused on rollovers of individual loans rather
than on the number of loans that a person took out. For example, Indiana found, in 1999,
that 77% of loans were renewed, with the average customer renewing the loan ten times.
Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace:
The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Socio-Economic Role of
Usury Laws zn Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REv. 589, 608 (2000). Wisconsin data from 2001
indicated that 53% of payday loans were rollovers. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 20.
46. ERNST ET AL., supra note 16, at 2.
47. Id.
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protection for the Consumer Federation of America, argues, given the
frequency with which most borrowers use payday loans, describing
them as short-term credit is fiction. 48
Often customers take out loans with multiple lenders to pay off
the debt from another payday lender-borrowing from Peter to pay
Paul.49 The study sponsored by the lending industry shows that almost
half of all customers use multiple lenders in a given year.50 Although
regulations in many states have attempted to address the problem of
chronic borrowing by limiting the number of loans one can take out,
being able to go from one lender to another has undermined the ef-
fectiveness of these rules. 51
While the payday lending industry often defends its products by
comparing the costs of a payday loan to fees for insufficient funds for
a checking account or other late fees, the high frequency of use un-
dermines such arguments. The average penalty for writing a check
with insufficient funds in one's account is approximately $20 to $30.52
Compared to the cost of a single payday loan for $100, which is only
$15 to $20 if the amount is paid back in full after a person's next
paycheck, then an individual is saving money in the short term. The
payday lending industry argues that insufficient funds fees, which they
view asjust as costly as payday loans, should therefore receive the same
scrutiny as payday lenders.53 If a person renews the loan, however, the
fees for using a payday loan double, and the costs of taking out the
loan are higher than the bounced check. Banks respond to the criti-
48. John Hackett, Ethically Tainted, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 2001, at 50; see also Stegman &
Faris, supra note 2, at 11.
49. Chessin, supra note 11.
50. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 40.
51. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 20. The authors' data indicates that even after
strict regulation in North Carolina, the number of loans per customer went up from 5.8
loans in 1999 to 7.3 loans in 2000. However, even that may be a gross underestimation of
the amount of loans per customer because the Commission of Banking did not measure if
the same customer was going to more than one payday lender. Id. at 20-21. As discussed in
Part II infra, a few states have created statewide databases so that customers cannot bounce
from one lender to another without anyone noticing; while that should eliminate some
abuses of payday loans, the databases have had limited effect on the number of loans per
customer.
52. Hackett, supra note 48. As Don Gayhardt, President of Dollar Financial, recently
said, "If it only cost $10 to bounce a check, I'm not sure we would have nearly as big a
payday loan industry." Michelle Singletary, Payday Loans: Costly Cash, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25,
2007, at F1.
53. Hackett, supra note 48.
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cism of the costs of their fees by explaining that their fees only occur
once and cannot lead to a cycle of repeated payments. 54
Moreover, despite repeated payments, often to multiple lenders,
the use of payday loans does not help a consumer build credit. Nor-
mally, when one makes payments on loans or other bills, he or she
benefits because those payments are reported to national credit bu-
reaus. 55 This increases one's access to other forms of credit because
his or her credit rating improves. 56 In contrast, payday lenders are
"dead-end credit" because even if a person pays back his or her loan
on time, it is not reflected in his or her credit score.57 As described
above, most people who use payday loans have credit problems and
have been rejected when asking for credit; unfortunately, even careful
payment of payday loans cannot improve the chances of receiving
other credit products.
The fundamental problem with payday loans may not be that
people renew them regularly or use them too frequently, but that they
are too difficult to pay back within one pay period.58 A family making
about $30,000 per year, who is facing a temporary financial emer-
gency, cannot afford a few hundred dollars out of their next paycheck
without going further into debt or taking out another loan. Informa-
tion presented at the Lieberman forum indicated a family could not
recover from an emergency that quickly and still meet their other ob-
ligations.59 As the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
wrote recently, many customers of payday lenders have long-term
credit needs that these products are not satisfying.60 If a person can-
not pay back the loan immediately, the interest can exceed the total
amount of the loan in four months, which is "counterproductive" to
the long-term financial health of the consumer.61 According to con-
sumer advocates and many impartial observers, the product is funda-
mentally flawed.
54. Id.
55. NEFE, supra note 3, at 24-25 (quoting EDwARD J. GALLAGLy & DARLA DERNOVSEK,
CTR. FOR PROF'L DEV., FAIR DEAL: CREATING CREDIT UNION ALTERNATIVES TO FRINGE FINAN-
CIAL SERVICES (2000)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. ERNST ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
59. NEFE, supra note 3, at 20; see also Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 22 (noting
that the structure of payday loans prevents people from regaining control of their
finances).
60. FDIC, GUIDELINES FOR PAYDAY LENDING (2005) [hereinafter FDIC GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fill405a.html.
61. KING ET AL., supra note 45, at 8 (quoting a stock analyst at Morgan Stanley).
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D. Why do Consumers Choose Payday Loans Despite the Costs?
Most people who use payday lenders profess awareness of the
high costs and do not claim they are saving money compared to over-
draft fees or late penalties; instead, they choose payday loans primarily
because of the convenience and privacy that the product offers. Un-
like qualifying for other forms of credit, qualifying for money is easy
and fast-just as the advertisements say-without any of the stigma of
admitting to friends, family, or a financial institution that you cannot
make ends meet. Regulation and alternative products will likely never
work unless they acknowledge these realities.
Many payday-loan consumers do not trust mainstream financial
institutions.6 2 Unlike people who frequent check cashers instead of
having bank accounts, those who use payday loans at least have ac-
counts with mainstream financial institutions because having such an
account is one of the few requirements of taking out a payday loan.63
However, one focus-group study in California of low-income and eth-
nic consumers identified five ways in which fringe banks, like check-
cashers, are superior to mainstream banks: easier access to cash; acces-
sible locations; better treatment of customers; greater trustworthiness;
and better service because of the many useful products in one loca-
tion, better hours, and more Spanish-speaking employees. 64 Similarly,
people use payday loans at least partially because they do not trust or
understand the banks with whom they have accounts. Thus, simply
providing more banks in low-income communities is not the answer to
the proliferation of payday lenders in low-income communities. While
banks are certainly more common in higher-income communities,
they are present in low-income communities as well. 6 5 The fees in-
volved in payday loans, although not always clearly marked in terms of
62. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 13.
63. Reasons given by those who do not have checking accounts at all include the costs
of ownership of an account, distrust of banks, and privacy concerns. Michael S. Barr, Bank-
ing thePoor, 21 YALEJ. ON REG. 121, 131-32 (2004); see alsoJames H. Carr &Jenny Schuetz,
Fannie Mae Found., Financial Services in Distressed Communities: Framing the Issue, Finding
Solutions, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 5, 7
(2001), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/financial.PDF (not-
ing that while proximity to mainstream banks matters, lack of familiarity with mainstream
banks, a belief that a person will not write enough checks for the account, and a lack of
trust affect when people choose to avoid mainstream banks).
64. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 13.
65. Id.
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APRs, are at least transparent to customers. 66 Borrowers "do indicate
that they know it's expensive, but at least they know exactly what the
dollar amount of the fee will be. To them, nothing is 'hidden,' which
is the perception of transactions with banks and credit card compa-
nies. ' 67 Any attempts to move consumers away from the use of payday
loans must acknowledge that mainstream institutions offer money
with strict and confusing rules, causing consumers not to trust banks.
In one study, approximately 60% of customers cited the easy pro-
cess for obtaining funds as the most important reason for selecting
payday loans over other potential sources of credit. 68 Part of the con-
venience, like check-cashers, is the location of payday lenders, which
was the second most important reason, but only to roughly 11% of
respondents. 69 The process of obtaining funds is also straightforward.
Banks and credit unions cannot compete with cash available in twenty
minutes; normally, mainstream institutions want people who receive
money to go through full financial checks, while those with a history
of credit problems will at least need to take classes on financial plan-
ning.70 As well-intentioned as these restrictions are, they drive people
to alternative lenders. Considering that many payday loan consumers
have a history of poor credit, have been rejected when applying for
credit,71 have used credit counseling, and have a history of bounced
checks and collection agency referrals, 72 mainstream banks often can-
not provide the short-term credit that these customers need or can
only do so with strings attached.
Payday loan consumers also indicate that the privacy of the trans-
action matters.7 3 Just like with an account at a bank or credit union, a
person is often giving the payday lender access to his or her bank
66. NEFE, supra note 3, at 19-20. The response of consumer advocates to this point is
that the costs may be clear in taking out the loan for a two-week period, but the frequency
with which people continually renew the loan makes the stated prices misleading.
67. Id. at 30.
68. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 51. Another study showed that almost
half of respondents chose payday lenders over other forms of credit because of conve-
nience. NEFE, supra note 3 (citing CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING:
How BANKS HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS (2001)).
69. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 52.
70. NEFE, supra note 3; see also Schaaf, supra note 22, at 344 (observing that consum-
ers of payday loans often value immediate convenience over costs).
71. Michele Hodson et al., Payday Lending, FYI (FDIC, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 29,
2003, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/012903fyi.html.
72. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 18.
73. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 52. People who were asked why they
chose payday loans over other options listed privacy as the third most popular reason, with
9% selecting it. Id.
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account through the process of electronic debit. 74 However, it feels
more private because the company providing the money is not asking
questions about why it is needed or trying to form a long-term rela-
tionship where he or she judges the consumer's behavior and
choices. 75 Customers want to avoid the stigma of not being able to
make a payment,76 so going into debt to do so is an acceptable way of
dealing with this problem and one that is part of modern life. 77
If payday lenders disappeared and banks continued to fail to pro-
vide short-term credit, people would likely turn to their families and
communities for help. Payday lending seems to have replaced social
and family networks as a source of emergency financial support for
many people. In one recent survey, only a small number of borrowers
even considered asking for financial help from friends or family in-
stead of using payday loans. 78 People do not want to admit to others
that they need assistance when they can get it so easily on their own
from payday lenders. When people use the product responsibly and
are able to manage their debt, payday loans are helpful; consumers
should be able to be self-sufficient without having to depend on the
whims of family and friends.
Although payday lenders can no longer offer their product to the
military, the fact that members of the armed forces used the product
demonstrates the appeal of easy money without questions. The mili-
tary offered various programs with favorable terms, such as the Com-
manders Referral Program with zero interest. 79 Yet, according to one
estimate, 26% of military households had borrowed from payday lend-
ers.80 Despite the military's generous offers to its members, the armed
forces punish those with financial problems; the consequences of fi-
nancial difficulties include reprimand, loss of security clearance, de-
nial of promotion, court martial, and dishonorable discharge.8
Moreover, commanding officers often exert great pressure to ensure
that soldiers pay their bills.8 2 Payday loans, though, do not require
74. NEFE, supra note 3, at 7.
75. Id. at 15-16.
76. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 36.
77. NEFE, supra note 3, at 16.
78. Id. (citing churches, charitable organizations, and government agencies as places
to which people turned before the existence of payday loans).
79. See JABRINA ROBINSON, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, ALTERNATIVES TO PAYDAY
LENDING: MOVING AWAY FROM AN ABUSIVE PRODUCT (2005), available at http://www.respon-
siblelending.org/pdfs/pbO13-Payday.Alternatives-0805.pdf.
80. Id.; Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 690.
81. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 685.
82. Id.
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admitting one's financial problems to one's superior, nor do they re-
quire sitting in a bank office hoping that no one notices one is
there.8 3 Members of the military may have had incentives to take ad-
vantage of the anonymity of payday loans, but a similar logic applies to
anyone who does not want anyone asking questions about why they
are short for cash.
While part of the acceptance of payday loans is likely attributable
to the culture of debt in America, the specific marketing of payday
loans also deserves credit for shaping this perception. Advertisements
cast the loans as a "typical middle-class product" for short-term needs
that are a normal part of life.8 4 The website of the Community Finan-
cial Services Association of America ("CFSA"), the premier trade or-
ganization of payday lenders, shows a diverse group of respectable-
looking people who appear to be in their thirties or older.8 5 It is a
group of customers that any business would be proud to have. The
"voices of payday advance" section of the website features people who
use the product;8 6 they are not as young and attractive as the models
on the front page, but they describe how they use the product to help
provide for their families or deal with emergencies.8 7 CFSA's recent
television ad campaign urging responsible use of payday loans shows a
diverse group of people with car trouble and medical emergencies.88
The message is clear: using payday loans is a part of life for hard-work-
ing people who face emergencies and need to provide for their
families.
Contrary to what many consumer advocates indicate, consumers
who use payday loans are generally satisfied, and, more importantly,
understand the limitations of the product. In the most comprehensive
examination of the attitudes of customers toward payday lenders, al-
most three-quarters agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "the
government should limit the fees charged by payday advance compa-
nies," while closer to nine in ten agreed or strongly agreed that "pay-
day advance companies provide a useful service to consumers."8 9
83. NEFE, supra note 3, at 18.
84. Id.
85. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass'n of Am., http://www.cfsa.net (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
86. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass'n of Am., Voices of Payday Advance, http://www.cfsa.net/
voices.ofipayday.advance.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 35-36. The authors dismiss the desire to
have lower fees as consistent with surveys in other industries and "a lack of understanding
of competition in a market economy." Id. This Article stands in contrast to the nearly
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More than two-thirds did not want the government to limit the
amount of payday advances that a person could receive in one year,
and more than three in five did not even want a limit on the amount
of consecutive renewals a customer could have. 90 When asked about
their most recent advance, three-quarters of respondents said they
were either "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied." 91 Those customers
who were dissatisfied cited high costs (either high interest rates, fi-
nance charges, or other general costs) more than three-fifths of the
time, while difficulty getting out of debt was cited less than 2% of the
time.92 In comparing the costs of payday loans to other late fees and
penalties, more than 40% of consumers said the cost of payday loans
was higher than returned check fees or late fees on mortgages, and
more than one-third said the fees were higher than on credit card
debt, so many users view the payday loans as an expensive product.93
Less than 4% of consumers said they chose to use payday loans instead
of other forms of credit because of the cost.94
The California focus groups on fringe bankers found that payday
lenders "amassed more negatives than any other [financial services]
providers. '95 Even those who used payday lending described the loans
as "necessary evils."'96 Payday loan researchers' anecdotal evidence of
borrowers in North Carolina indicated a similar distaste due to "high
costs and addictive qualities."97 While some people certainly become
caught in cycles of debt, payday loan users demonstrate that they un-
derstand the costs involved and feel the product provides a necessary
service. Consumers are prioritizing convenience and privacy over high
costs and potential risks.
The payday loan industry justifies the finance charges involved in
payday loans by pointing to a number of factors. First, the origination
costs of a small loan are higher per dollar borrowed than those of a
larger loan because the underwriting process is relatively similar for
universally acknowledged fact that competition between lenders, if it exists, fails to drive
down prices. See infra Part III for further discussion of competition.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 52.
92. Id. at 52-53.
93. Id. at 37. Approximately one-quarter of respondents said the costs were the same
and approximately one-quarter said they were lower in each case for payday loans, while
some respondents said they did not know. Id.
94. Id. at 52.
95. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 13.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 13-14.
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each. 98 Second, the industry cites to the long hours that many payday
lending outlets stay open to maximize convenience. 99 Third, despite
the fact that many customers do not view payday loans as cheaper than
various late fees, the industry emphasizes its prices compared to other
charges that low-income consumers face. 10 0 CFSA has published on its
website a study comparing payday lending fees to returned check
charges, apartment rental late fees, mortgage late fees, car payment
late fees, and utility late fees, finding payday loans to involve compara-
ble or lower prices as long as customers do not rollover the loans. 10 1
Fourth, using payday loans instead of missing a payment protects
one's credit rating, while avoiding an insufficient funds penalty pro-
tects a customer's relationship with his or her bank.1 0 2 Finally, an in-
credible demand for short-term, high-cost credit exists. 10 3 Thus, the
industry views itself as fulfilling a need with a product that is naturally
expensive.
Banks are currently hard-pressed to change the status quo of con-
sumers using payday loans for short-term credit because-at least to
some borrowers-banks are comparatively inconvenient and burden-
some, even if this is due to well-meaning regulations that ensure finan-
cial institutions are responsible when making credit available. If
consumer advocates want people to stop frequenting payday lenders,
a product that offers some of the same convenience and privacy must
be available.
98. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 3. Payday lenders rarely use credit bu-
reaus, however, which should cut costs. Id.
99. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 19. The Financial Service Centers of America
(www.fisca.org), which used to be the National Check Casher's Association, includes mem-
bers who do more than payday lending; they also strongly emphasize the convenience of
their products. Fin. Serv. Ctrs. of Am., About FISCA, http://www.fisca.org/about.htm (last
visited Nov. 19, 2007).
100. SHEILA BAIR, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., Low-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND
OBSTACLES 7 (2005), available at http://www.aecforg/publications/data/payday-loans.
pdf.
101. CMTy. FIN. SERVS. ASS'N OF AM., PAYDAY ADVANCE: A COST EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE
(2002), avalable at http://www.cfsa.net/downloads/industry-survey.pdf; see also Myth vs.
Reality, supra note 4.
102. !d.; Schaaf, supra note 22, at 348.
103. See infra Part V (describing the history of payday loans).
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11. The Legal Status of Payday Loans
A. Federal Regulation Severely Limits the "Rent-a-Bank" Model
For many years, state attempts to limit payday lending interest
rates faced a federal preemption hurdle.10 4 Banks chartered in states
without interest rate caps could "rent" their charters to payday lenders
in states with restrictions on interest rates, thereby avoiding state usury
laws. 10 5 In 2005, however, FDIC became the last federal regulator of
the banking industry to impose strict payday loan regulations related
to payday loans on the banks, effectively closing the last major loop-
hole for payday lenders. 106
Payday lenders had, until recently, taken advantage of the same
laws that allow the credit card companies to export rates from one
state to another.1 0 7 In Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha Service
Corp.,'08 the United States Supreme Court started the race to remove
limits on interest rates when it addressed the question of what interest
rate would apply when a federally-chartered bank in one state charged
interest on a credit card in excess of the usury laws of the state where
the customer resided. t0 9 The Court held that federally-chartered
banks could export their interest rates to states where the interest
rates would normally violate usury laws."Il 0 In order to keep the finan-
cial services industry from leaving their states for those with more
friendly laws, many legislatures had to remove or significantly weaken
interest rate caps. 1 '
To allow state-chartered banks to compete with nationally-
chartered banks, Congress passed the Depository Institution Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act'1 2 ("DIDMCA") of 1980, which
granted state banks the same power to export their rates as national
banks."13 This allowed payday lending companies to partner with
banks based in states without interest rate caps to avoid the laws of the
state where they actually did business-renting the bank's charter in
order to operate where it would otherwise be prohibited from operat-
104. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
105. Id. at 310-12.
106. Id.
107. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 704-07.
108. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
109. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 705 (citing Marquette Nat'l Bank, 439 U.S. at
310-12).
110. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 439 U.S. at 310-12.
111. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 705.
112. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000).
113. Id.
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ing.114 In practice, the payday loan company would take care of every
aspect of the loan, including staff, advertising, and the loan process.1 1 5
While the bank would technically handle the loan transaction itself,
the customer would not know about its involvement, and, as part of
the agreement with the rented bank, the payday lender would imme-
diately purchase the right to collect from the customer.' 6 In ex-
change, the bank would receive a percentage or small fee from each
loan. 11 7
Not all federal regulatory agencies reacted to the rent-a-bank
phenomenon at the same pace. Different federal agencies oversee dif-
ferent federally insured depository institutions: the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") regulates nationally-chartered
banks, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") regulates nationally-
chartered thrifts, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") regulates state-
chartered members of the Federal Reserve System, and FDIC regu-
lates non-member banks. 1 8 In a joint letter by OCC and OTS in
2000, OCC and OTS were the first to advise their member banks that
letting other companies effectively borrow their charters could lead to
regulatory action. 119 The letter from the agencies expressed concern
with both the financial soundness of payday loans and the potential
abuse of vulnerable consumers. 120 The agencies also saw financial
risks for the banks renting their charters because the credit risks in
such a transaction were not clear.12 1 Participating in payday loans
raised reputational risks as well because the payday loan companies
with whom the banks partnered were aiming to avoid state laws, and
the banks themselves were not monitoring the marketing and execu-
tion of such loans despite having an economic interest in the
transactions. 122
Although the agencies' advisory notice was not clear on the ex-
tent to which they would try to prevent payday loans, both agencies
have historically taken enough enforcement actions against regulated
banks to convince those they oversee to discontinue partnerships with
114. KING ET AL., supra note 45, at 4.
115. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 706.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. BAIR, supra note 100, at 13.
119. SMALE, supra note 1, at 4.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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payday lenders.1 23 However, the agencies' actions were not unequivo-
cal statements that payday loans are pernicious. In fact, the stated rea-
sons for disrupting the relationships were based more on the banks'
partnerships with payday lenders not meeting the financial standards
of the agencies, rather than on consumer protection concerns.124 For
instance, when OCC entered into an agreement with one of its banks
to stop issuing payday loans through another company, it stated that:
The Bank had risked its financial viability by concentrating in one
line of business-payday lending; lt] he Bank relinquished supervi-
sion of the program to a single third party originator of payday
loans; and It] he payday lending program was conducted on an un-
safe and unsound basis, in violation of a multitude of standards of
safe and sound banking, compliance requirements, and OCC
guidance.1 25
For these reasons, OCC gave negative ratings to all the banks it
regulated that engaged in rent-a-bank payday lending, which led the
banks to leave the industry to avoid losing their charters.1 26 Despite
the relatively nonjudgmental language of these sanctions, consumer
advocates have interpreted these measures as clear repudiations of
payday lending.127
FDIC was late to the party, however, allowing its members to con-
tinue to participate in rent-a-bank arrangements until 2005. FDIC's
institutional focus has been one of preventing bank failures, and it is
this history that is primarily responsible for FDIC's indifference to a
small number of its banks acting as a conduit for a large percentage of
the nation's payday loans. 128 In 2003, FDIC issued guidelines for affili-
123. Id. at 5 (noting that OTS has intervened with two rent-a-bank partnerships and
OCC has intervened with four rent-a-bank partnerships).
124. Johnson, supra note 5, at 114.
125. Id. at 114-15 (citing Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fact
Sheet: Eagle National Bank Consent Order (Jan. 3, 2002), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
release/2002-01a.doc). In another case, OCC forced a bank to leave the industry after its
payday lending partner left customer loan files in the trash behind the office. Chin, supra
note 10, at 736-37. OCC cited the bank's inability to "safeguard the files of customers" in
accordance with basic procedures when it entered into a partnership for the purpose of
payday lending. Id.
126. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 706-07.
127. KING ET AL., supra note 45, at 4-5. I have not encountered anything specific about
actions the FRB has taken with state-chartered member banks, but this publication by the
Center for Responsible Lending indicates that they have also prohibited the practice of
rent-a-bank. Id. In 2001, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, responded to
an inquiry about the practice at FRB-regulated institutions by saying that very few of their
institutions seemed to be participating, so no action was required, but that they would
continue to monitor the practice. BUR, supra note 100, at 14.
128. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 707.
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ations with payday lenders that had little impact on the industry. 129
The guidelines stated that banks participating in payday loans should
have higher levels of capital available (as much of 100% of loans out-
standing), that such loans be classified as substandard, that the banks
manage the risks involved, and that the institutions limit the number
of renewals and extensions available to customers.1 30 The require-
ments followed the framework of the OCC and OTS guidelines, but
did not provide any strict limitations-only factors to consider when
participating in the loan arrangements.131 Consumer advocates pro-
tested that these FDIC guidelines were meaningless: the capital re-
quirements would not affect the banks because they would
immediately sell the loans back to their partners, while their state-
ments asking for limitations on rollovers and renewals lacked
substance.1 32
On March 1, 2005, FDIC offered Revised Examination Guidance
with regard to payday lending programs. 33 As the introductory letter
stated, since its 2003 guidelines, FDIC realized that banks partnered
with payday lenders were behaving "in a manner that is inconsistent
with the July 2003 guidance and inconsistent with prudent lending
practices."1 3 4 The 2005 Financial Institution Letter entitled "Payday
Lending Programs Revised Examination Guidance," which summa-
rized the new guidelines, set forth limitations designed in large part to
protect consumers from the problems associated with rollovers, espe-
cially those people who had long-term credit needs of which the pay-
day lenders were taking advantage. 3 5 The letter discussed the risks
involved in payday loans, including the credit, legal, reputational, and
compliance risks.1 36 Specifically, the guidance document required
that banking institutions ensure that their payday lending partners
were not giving loans to customers who had payday loans with any
129. BaR, supra note 100, at 15.
130. Id.
131. SMALE, supra note 1, at 5. Like the OCC and OTS publication, this document
focused primarily on the financial risks to the banks if they participated in these arrange-
ments. Hodson et al., supra note 71.
132. BAIR, supra note 100, at 15.
133. MICHAELJ. ZAMORS~i, FDIC Div. OF SUPERVISION & CONSUMER PROT., PAYDAY LEND-
ING PROGRAMS: REVISED EXAMINATION GUIDANCE (2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/financial/2005/fil1405.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The credit risk, which this Article does not address in great detail, derives from
the "borrower's limited financial capacity, the unsecured nature of the credit, and the
limited underwriting analysis." FDIC GUIDELINES, supra note 60.
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company for three of the previous twelve-months. 137 This translates
into a maximum of six loans in a twelve-month period-lower than
the average number of loans per customer per year in many states. 138
The guidelines also put the onus on the financial institution to
find ways to monitor how their customers are using their products,
even with other lenders. 139 To reinforce the importance of not being
able to borrow from multiple lenders to get around the rules, FDIC
bolds the phrase "at any lender"-the only time in this document that
FDIC uses bolds or italics to emphasize a point. 140 The financial insti-
tutions are also responsible for monitoring the compliance of the pay-
day lenders with whom they partner with the guidelines, including
whether the payday lender's bank provides the proper disclosures to
the customer. 41 FDIC expects the bank to dedicate an appropriate
amount of staff exclusively to the oversight process. 142 If a bank and its
payday lending partner could meet all of these guidelines, then it
could still operate its payday lending business, but questions would
remain about the financial viability of such an enterprise.
The regulations have forced almost all FDIC-regulated banks to
leave the payday lending industry.' 45 The most important effect of
FDIC closing this loophole, however, is that it gives the states the abil-
ity to regulate payday lending as they see fit without rate exportation
undermining their efforts to protect consumers.
B. Opportunities for Regulation: Tough State Laws
The majority of states allow use of payday loans through laws that
license payday lenders or that create exceptions to normal usury laws.
Eleven states prohibit-or effectively prohibit through stringent regu-
lation-the practice of payday lending in their states, but the number
is constantly changing as states either create statutory safe harbors or
137. ZAMORSKi, supra note 133.
138. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the repeated use of payday loans.
139. Some states have partnered with a private company that helps create statewide
databases of payday loan usage to address this problem. See infra Part II.B.
140. FDIC GUIDELINES, supra note 60.
141. Id. The immediate reaction of consumer advocates was to worry that the guide-
lines did not say clearly enough that rent-a-bank was illegal. CRL 2005, supra note 14.
142. FDIC GUIDELINES, supra note 60. FDIC stated that if the banks did not properly
limit loans through oversight of their payday lending partners, the banks would be failing
to meet their requirements under the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"). Id. The CRA
is discussed briefly at Part IV infra.
143. KING ET AL., supra note 45, at 5.
Winter 2008]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
tighten regulations. 144 While many states have created regulatory
frameworks for payday lending in their states, only now, with FDIC
closing the final rent-a-bank loophole, does the regulatory power
functionally revert to the states. The payday lending industry lobbied
states to create legal exemptions for payday lending in each state, ar-
guing that it is preferable to allow a regulated industry to function
under the watchful eye of the law rather than force its consumer to go
to the Internet to find payday lenders that the state will be unable to
regulate. 145 After the FDIC changes, consumer advocates have pre-
dicted that the industry's push to create safe harbors for its business
will only intensify. 146
Most state laws that authorize payday lending create exceptions to
state usury laws that allow payday lenders to charge the standard $15
to $20 per $100 loan, which translates to an APR of at least 390%.147
Other states, such as Idaho, have no limits on interest rates, which
allows payday lenders to operate freely and which used to make those
states good places from which to export rates.148 The real problem
with most state laws authorizing payday lending is that they often in-
clude language intended to limit the harsher effects of payday loans,
such as frequent rollovers, but these terms are either precatory or easy
to avoid. Delaware law, for example, limits the number of rollovers to
four, but the law is unclear and allows lenders to refinance any out-
standing loans to start the process again.1 49 Colorado enacted a law in
2000 that limited the rate that payday lenders could charge and the
number of renewals to one per loan, but it failed to prevent people
borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, so no decrease in the use of payday
144. Id. (reporting that eleven states do not allow payday lending, but not identifying
which). But see Consumer Fed'n of Am., Legal Status, http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/
lstatus.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2007) (listing twelve states as prohibiting payday loans, but
not identifying when the list was last updated). As of 2000, the industry identified seven-
teen states that prohibited payday lending. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5. The
decrease in the number of states prohibiting payday loans between 2000 and 2006 reflects
either the industry's growing strength or states' decisions that, since they could not prevent
payday loans under the old regulatory environment, they might as well try to regulate
them. However, none of the surveys of state laws identifies their methodology for judging
which states prohibit payday loans, so any conclusions from these patterns ought to be
taken with caution.
145. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass'n of Am., Payday Advance State Legislation, http://
www.cfsa.net/state-legislation.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
146. CRL 2005, supra note 14.
147. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25 (describing the legal status of payday lending in
twenty states, most of which have exceptions in this range).
148. Id. at 746.
149. Id. at 733.
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loans occurred. 50 California is one of a number of states that prohib-
its taking out a new payday loan to pay off a previous payday loan, but
it does not have a mechanism in place to ensure such practices do not
occur.
1 5 1
Some states have made significant efforts to restrain payday lend-
ing, or at least limit its excesses. Florida, trying to combat the
problems of payday lenders evading state restrictions on rollovers and
customers borrowing from multiple lenders at the same time, uses a
statewide database for all customers who use payday lenders.1 52 Geor-
gia has taken a stricter approach by enacting standards that have effec-
tively banned payday lending. 153
The Florida statute allows standard payday lending rates to apply
while preventing rollovers. 154 The rules in Florida are very strict re-
garding how a customer uses payday loans: the law prohibits any rol-
lovers of payday loans; a customer cannot take out a payday loan until
at least twenty-four hours after the completion of the previous loan;
lenders cannot extend any payday loans or consolidate one loan with
another loan; and a lender cannot offer a loan to someone who al-
ready has a loan out with a different payday lender. 155 Furthermore,
the lender cannot deposit a check from the borrower as long as the
borrower informs the lender that not enough money is in his or her
account, and the lender must allow the customer a sixty-day grace pe-
riod to pay back the loan if the customer agrees to state-approved
credit counseling. 15 6 This prevents a lender from threatening a bor-
rower with insufficient fund fees that would occur if the lender cashed
150. Chessin, supra note 11, at 418-19.
151. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 718. Idaho outlaws the same practice, but
does not seem to prohibit using one payday lender to pay off the loan from another
lender. Id. at 746.
152. Id. at 741.
153. In fact, while the law does not expressly ban payday lending, the Consumer Feder-
ation of America's list of states without payday loans includes Georgia as a state where laws
prevent the practice. Consumer Fed'n of Am., supra note 144.
154. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 740.
155. VERITEC, WHITE PAPER ANALYSIS OF CRL REPORT: FINANCIAL QUICKSAND 3 (2007),
available at http://www.veritecs.com/CRL.Whitepaper-AnalysisRI.pdf; Graves & Peter-
son, supra note 25, at 740-41.
156. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 741. Grace-period usage has increased dra-
matically since the implementation of the statewide database from a few hundred per
month in 2002 to a few thousand per month in 2006. VERITEC, supra note 155, at 9.
Whether that means more people are abusing the product or more lenders are complying
with the state regulations is unclear, but a five-fold increase in the number of payday lend-
ers has occurred since 2002. See Richard Burnett, Some Payday Lenders Are Flouting Florida's
Reform Law, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 2007, at D1.
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the check. Florida's statewide database is essential because it requires
payday lenders to enter basic information about each of their custom-
ers-name, address, driver's license number, social security number,
amount of transaction, and the date the transaction started and
ended.157
Measuring the effect of these regulations is difficult. On the one
hand, they have led to an 82% decrease in the number of customers
using multiple payday lenders in Florida. 158 On the other hand, Flor-
ida does not stand out when measuring the number of loans the aver-
age customer takes out in one year. The Center for Responsible
Lending examined state regulatory data and found that the average
borrower in Florida took out eight loans per year, while the national
average was nine. 159 These kinds of regulations do not appear to have
any impact on revenues either, which would explain why the payday
lending industry is not opposed to these databases. 160 Veritec, the
company that operates Florida's database and was recently employed
by Oklahoma and Michigan to create similar databases, defends the
effectiveness of its database by arguing that it allows the law against
rollovers to be effective. 1'6 While the regulation does not result in a
significant impact on the number of loans per borrower, it may create
a legal environment that reduces the financial incentives to operate in
Florida. In their study of how payday lenders concentrated around
military bases, researchers noted that Florida has a relatively small
number of payday lenders given its size-about the same number as
Missouri and Alabama-despite having approximately ten million
more people than either state. 162 The lower number of payday lenders
in Florida is not necessarily the by-product of the stringent laws,
though, as the causal link between the number of lenders in a state
and the stringency of state regulation has not yet been studied in
detail.
The debate over the usefulness of these tough state regulations
highlights a problem in the consumer advocates' criticism. Taking out
eight or nine loans per year in Florida, with stricter enforcement of
rollover limits, is not the same problem as taking out the same
amount of loans in a state with lax enforcement of rollover restric-
157. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 741.
158. Id. at 740-41.
159. KING ET AL., supra note 45.
160. Id. at 13. The industry has continued to grow in Florida since the law was passed.
See Burnett, supra note 156.
161. VERITEC, supra note 155, at 11.
162. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 741.
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tions. While consumer groups see eight loans per year and call it a
debt trap based on loan flipping, 163 an individual could take out eight
two-week loans over the course of a fifty-two week year and repay each
loan. This does not mean that people in Florida or other states that
effectively limit rollovers do not overuse a very expensive product if
they take out payday loans eight times per year, that they are not using
a short-term product for a long-term problem, or that they do not
need credit counseling. Overusing payday loans, however, is not as
dramatic a problem as being unable to pay back the loan and needing
to make weekly payments without ever paying down the principal,
thus becoming trapped in a "cycle of debt." The conditions for bor-
rowers in Florida, despite taking out similar numbers of loans per year
as customers in other states, may be substantially better because of the
waiting periods between loans and the automatic grace period when
one is unable to pay back a loan. Yet, consumer advocates do not al-
ways acknowledge the difference.
Before FDIC strongly discouraged its banks from exporting rates,
Georgia went a different route by enacting a law in 2005 that effec-
tively banned the payday lending industry by limiting the interest rates
that could be used by in-state agents of out-of-state-banks that ex-
ported their rates. 164 The Georgia statute made payday lending a
criminal offense and provided that the privileged status of out-of-state
banks that allowed them to export their rates would not apply to their
in-state agents as long as the agent retained the "predominant eco-
nomic interest" in the loan. 65 The interest rate limit on consumer
loans in Georgia is 60%.166
163. KING ET AL., supra note 45, at 6. The Center for Responsible Lending reports that
89% of loans in Florida go to borrowers with more than five loans per year, with almost
identical numbers in other states. Id.
164. GA. CODE ANN. §16-17-2 (2006).
165. Id.; ELLEN HARNICK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, GEORGIA'S PAYDAY LOAN LAW:
A MODEL FOR PREVENTING PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2006), available at http://
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pa-GeorgiaPayday-0606.pdf.
166. GA. CODE ANN. §16-17-2. The Georgia legislature is currently considering
reauthorizing payday loans through a law written by the industry. The payday lending in-
dustry says that this law responds to legitimate concerns about abusive practices because it
limits fees to $15 per loan, prohibits rollovers, and allows an automatic four pay period
extension if asked; this would also be cheaper than the loan installment operators who
have taken advantage of the disappearance of payday lenders from Georgia. Jabo Covert,
Editorial, Tight Rules Make Case for Short-Term Cash Advances, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 1,
2007, at A19; Maureen Downey, Editorial, Choosing Exploitation; Support for Payday Lending
Bill Exposes Lawmakers' Loyalty to Special Interests That Fund Their Campaigns, ATLANTA J.
CONST, Mar. 1, 2007, at A18. One should note that the author, Jabo Covert, is the Vice
President of a large payday lender, Check into Cash.
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In Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker,167 the payday lending industry chal-
lenged the Georgia law as violating federal preemption of state laws as
part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 168 ("FDIA"), which allows
state banks to export their rates. 169 The district court held that the
Georgia law did not violate the FDIA because the out-of-state banks
still have a right to charge their own interest rates. 170 However, they
now cannot go through "de facto lenders," identified in the law as
those with a predominant economic interest.17 1 The court relied on
similar laws being upheld in other states, as well as statements by fed-
eral regulators indicating that the protections of federal banking laws
should not extend to partners in rent-a-bank agreements. 172
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed by a two to one deci-
sion.' 73 The majority opinion focused on the ability of the banks to
continue to operate by either opening their own stores in Georgia or
by using an in-state agent who would comply with the law.1 74 States
could regulate the collateral activities of banks in their states because
the FDIA, although preempting regulation of interest rates, does not
prevent state regulation of banks. 75 A rehearing en banc was
prompted by a scathing dissent that argued this ruling could give state
governments the power to upend the national banking laws that guar-
antee the banks' ability to export their rates by regulating those banks
out of existence through restrictions on collateral activities. 176 Be-
cause the changes in FDIC regulations prompted the out-of-state
banks to discontinue their operations-at least temporarily-the Elev-
enth Circuit vacated the decision on mootness grounds. 177 The banks
argued against a finding of mootness because they were working to
develop products that complied with the 2005 FDIC guidelines and
wanted a decision on the legitimacy of the law.1 78 While these deci-
167. 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004), affd, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), va-
cated as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2005).
168. 12 U.S.C. § 1829(a) (2000).
169. The industry brought a number of other challenges, under the Commerce Clause
and the Federal Arbitration Act, but none succeeded. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-58.
170. Id. at 1346.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1347-48.
173. Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker (Bankwest 1), 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated as
moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2005).
174. Id. at 1302.
175. Id. at 1304.
176. HARNICK, supra note 165. In this case, the collateral activities referred to the part-
nerships the banks made. Bankwest I, 411 F.3d at 1316-17.
177. Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker (Bankwest II), 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006).
178. Id. at 1366-67.
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sions are not binding precedent for other states that enact strict regu-
lations on out-of-state banks exporting their rates to sell payday loans,
assuming they can create a profitable product after the FDIC guide-
lines went into effect, they provide persuasive analyses of the issue.
While states now have the best opportunity to regulate payday
loans, it is unclear whether other states will follow the lead of Georgia
and ban them through strict statutes, follow the lead of Florida and
create effective regulation, or maintain the safe harbors for payday
loans that exist in the majority of states.
C. Opportunities for Regulation: Building on the Federal Ban of
Payday Loans to the Armed Forces
As part of a 2006 appropriations bill for the Department of De-
fense, Congress included an interest rate limitation of 36% on lending
to members of the military.179 While academics had previously
pointed out that payday lenders tended to congregate around military
bases, 180 Congress did not take action until the Department of De-
fense issued a warning in early 2005 stating that financial problems
compounded by payday lenders distracted service members from their
duties.t 81 The bill amended the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act' 8 2 by
adding a section limiting interest rates on loans to members of the
military or their dependents to 36%. 183
179. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)).
180. In their article on the geography of military payday lending, Graves and Peterson
argued that the clear geographic concentration of lenders around military installations
reflects that members of the armed forces make excellent customers because they have low
but steady incomes that do not respond well to emergencies. See Graves & Peterson, supra
note 25. They concluded that payday lenders were targeting members of the military. See
id.
181. William M. Welch, Law Caps Interest on "Payday" Advance to Servicemembers, USA
TODAY, Oct. 18, 2006, at A2; Associated Press, Congress to Limit Rates for Payday Loans,
MSNBC.com, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15062520.
182. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year of 2007 § 670;
Welch, supra note 181; Associated Press, supra note 181.
183. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year of 2007 § 670
(requiring various disclosures, prohibiting the use of rollovers and renewals, and preempt-
ing any contradictory state laws). Senators Jim Talent (R-MO) and Bill Nelson (D-FL) ad-
ded this provision of the appropriations bill by amendment and received very littie
attention in the congressional record. H.R. 5122, 109th Cong., 152 CONG. REc. S6405
(2006) (enacted). The only significant public discussion about this amendment in Con-
gress was Senator Talent's remarks in June of 2006 after introducing the amendment. Id.
He described the APRs that lenders charged as being "simply too much" and cited the
study by Graves and Peterson to say that payday lenders target military personnel. Id. He
also cited support from the active military as well as many veterans' organizations for pass-
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It goes without saying that when the United States is in war, re-
quests from the Department of Defense are taken very seriously. How-
ever, the same justifications used to prohibit payday lending to
members of the military apply to all consumers. The rates are the
same, as well as the strain such lending can put on a limited budget.
One can imagine less stringent methods of regulation that do not ef-
fectively eliminate the practice of lending money to members of the
military, such as moratoriums on payments while on active duty, but
Congress effectively chose a full prohibition.
Passing the ban on payday lending to service members raises the
question of whether Congress-especially considering the Democrats'
recent victories-would be willing to extend the military ban to other
consumers of payday loans. Congressmen submitted four bills in the
109th Congress regarding payday lending, but none of them left com-
mittee. Two of the bills aimed to eliminate payday lending entirely by
banning federally insured depository institutions from engaging in
the practice through amendments to the FDIA and to the Truth-in-
Lending Act' 84 ("TILA"). A bill that Representative Harold Ford in-
troduced twice would have repealed the DIDMCA of 1980 to amend
the Federal Credit Union Act' 85 to allow state usury laws to apply to
out-of-state banks exporting their rates. 186 The bill would have also
limited a customer to three rollovers per lender, with the third rol-
lover triggering further disclosures.1 87 The final bill, which Represen-
tative Bobby Rush proposed, aimed to create strict state licensing
requirements that had to be met before engaging in payday lend-
ing. 188 The law included a list of requirements with which consumer
advocates would have been pleased: no rollovers; thirty days between
loans; a minimum two weeks for repayment for every $50 of the loan;
a maximum loan amount of $300; providing detailed records to the
state; no threatening criminal or civil action against those who do not
pay; lenders proving that they would benefit the community through
their credit products; and a maximum APR of 36%.189 Representative
ing this restriction on payday lenders. Id. Scholars do not think the business of payday
lending can survive at such interest rates. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-6.
184. H.R. 5350, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006); S. 1878, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
185. 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (2000).
186. H.R. 4866, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006); H.R. 1643, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
187. H.R. 1643.
188. H.R. 1660, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
189. Id. In the earlier days of payday lending, lenders regularly filed bad check com-
plaints against borrowers who were unable to pay back the loans. Johnson, supra note 5, at
88-92. Despite the fact that bad check laws do not apply when the person receiving the
check knows he or she has insufficient funds, many judges were unfamiliar with the law,
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Rush has introduced this bill in the past without any success.190 One
sympathetic observer noted that this bill may never receive enough
support unless Representative Rush raises the maximum interest rate
above 36%.191
Strong federal regulation would realistically require Democrats to
unify behind the need to eliminate the practice. As evidence of the
unwillingness of all Democrats to support the prohibition of payday
lending, Democratic Governor of New Mexico and avowed centrist
Bill Richardson has responded to recent calls for reform of payday
lending practices in his state by offering to regulate the industry
through limits on fees and rollovers and offering long-term install-
ment plans.19 2 He chose not to align himself with those calling for the
death of payday lending by strict regulation. 193 As the Democrats try
to move to the center of America's political debate, they will likely shy
away from bills like Representative Rush's that would probably shut
down the business of payday lending. 19 4
If states continue to create safe harbors, or if Congress decides it
wants to impose some regulation, but not enough to eliminate the
industry, the question arises: at what level of regulation could payday
lenders survive, make a profit, and still serve the short-term credit
needs of low-wage earners?
and prosecutions were successful. Id. CFSA best practices prohibit prosecuting borrowers,
and statistics such as the 13,000 criminal complaints brought against customers in one
Dallas precinct in one year are hard to find today. However, as recently as 2002, the Colum-
bus, Ohio District Attorney's Office sent letters to those who defaulted on payday loans
that they could face criminal penalties despite that this clearly contradicted Ohio law. Id.
190. Johnson, supra note 5, at 134-35.
191. Id. Professor Johnson notes that the bill does not penalize states for failing to
enact the minimum standards, which would limit the impact of the consumer protection
provisions of the bill. Id. at 139. If the 36% APR limit were in place, however, it is question-
able whether the payday lending industry would be able to survive. Elliehausen & Law-
rence, supra note 4, at 5-6.
192. Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy, 'Payday Loans' Often Snowball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2006, at Al.
193. Id.
194. Given statements like Senator Talent's about how the APRs are too high and 36%
is reasonable, the same argument could carry the day with both Democrats and Republi-
cans who do not want to appear out of touch with everyday Americans. See supra note 183
and accompanying text.
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I. The Business of Payday Lending
A. Not High Risk, Just High Cost
Payday lenders face accusations of making wild profits off the vul-
nerability of low-income consumers, but they respond that they need
to charge high interest rates because of the risks involved.1 95 The data
on risks and returns seems to support industry critics, but regulations
that aim to squeeze some of the profitability out of the payday lenders
cannot go very far before they eliminate all profitability in the high-
volume, low-margin industry.
One justification for the tougher regulations enacted by FDIC in
2005 was the high credit risk involved in payday lending.' 96 Credit risk
is the "combination of the borrower's limited financial capacity, the
unsecured nature of the credit, and the limited underwriting analysis
of the borrower's ability to repay." 9 7 FDIC regulations demand high
capital reserves-"as high as 100% of the loans outstanding"-to
cover potential losses. 198
Data regarding the payday lending industry indicates, however,
that loan losses are not significantly higher than those associated with
other financial products, and there are no indications in the literature
of any payday lenders facing financial problems on account of loan
losses, commonly termed "charge-offs." One study found that the
charge-off rate for bad loans for payday lenders was 3.34%, which is
not terribly higher than the 2.69% charge-off rate for loans from com-
mercial banks, and is less than the 5.15% average charge-off rate for
credit cards.1 9 9 A study of payday lenders in North Carolina found
that fewer bad loans would help the bottom line, but the amount of
loans charged-off had a minor impact on profits compared to the con-
venience and location of the store.20 0 While FDIC worries about the
195. SeeJohnson, supra note 5, at 70.
196. FDIC GUIDELINES, supra note 60.
197. Id.
198. Id. The FDIC does not cite any specific high-risk situations that caught their atten-
tion. This raises the question whether the FDIC used the concerns about capital support as
an excuse tojustify restrictions actually prompted by the long-standing complaints of con-
sumer advocates, academics, and some in the financial industry.
199. Chessin, supra note 11, at 408; see also infra Part IV (describing how one credit
union that offers a competing product to payday loans artificially inflates the loss rates so
that, when it makes presentations about the program, other credit unions will take its data
seriously). The repeated rollovers, each of which counts as a completed loan, are not the
reason for the low default rates; in fact, default rates tend to rise with an increase in the
number of rollovers as some customers are simply putting off an inevitable default.
200. Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 23.
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lack of analysis conducted by a payday lender of a borrower's ability to
repay, the lenders do not. A study by the Illinois Department of Finan-
cial Institutions observed that payday lenders preferred not to have
too much information because they had no need to eliminate custom-
ers through screening data concerning the likelihood borrowers
would pay the loans back.20° The industry justifies its costs based on its
high-risk customers. Our normal assumptions about risk would sup-
port this claim, but the data does not.
Payday lenders can afford charge-offs somewhat higher than
mainstream banks because of the incredible rates of return on their
product. The industry reported gross margins of 30% to 45% of reve-
nue, losses at 1% to 1.3% of receivables, and a 24% rate of return on
investment.20 2 After legalizing the practice, the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Financial Institutions reported that payday lenders earned a
return on investment of approximately 30%.203 According to one pro-
fessor of economics, payday lenders earn returns on equity at ten to
twenty times the rates of traditional banks. 20 4 An official for FDIC also
acknowledged that the high prices lead to high margins for the indus-
try, leading to the conclusion that the risk involved in payday loans
does not, by itself, justify the price. 205
Another basis for criticizing the industry is the utter lack of price
competition among payday lenders. Those who urge greater regula-
tion often cite to this as evidence of a basic market failure that de-
mands legislation to protect the consumer.20 6 For example, after
Colorado passed an industry-approved bill regulating payday loans,
over 89% of payday loan lenders charged a finance fee of the exact
maximum amount allowed under the law, and that percentage in-
201. Id.
202. Barr, supra note 63, at 150.
203. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 664.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Chin, supra note 10, at 740-41; see also KING ET AL., supra note 45, at 9. But see
Morgan, supra note 8, at 20-21 fig.4 (showing a correlation between an increase of every
fifty stores in a city and a decrease by $0.50 of the price of a loan). However, the Morgan
analysis has a number of obvious flaws. First, the study matches price data from 2001 and
store data from 2005 in different studies. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CRL REVIEW OF
DEFINING AND DETECTING PREDATORY LENDING (2007), available at http://www.responsible
lending.org/pdfs/Review-of-Morgan-paper.pdf. Second, and more importantly, Morgan's
regression analysis does not take into account the key factor in the cost of loans-statutory
maximums. The Flannery and Samolyk research indicates that almost all lenders charge
the maximum amount under the law. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 9-10. If any-
thing, Morgan's regression analysis might show that more stores leads to regulation, which
would then result in lower prices.
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creased to almost 93% in two years.20 7 FDIC also conducted a nation-
wide survey that found that most payday lenders offered prices at or
near the statutory limit.2 0 8
Most commentators attribute this market characteristic to a com-
bination of consumers who need immediate assistance and a lack of
information available from lenders that would allow borrowers to
compare finance charges. The need for immediate cash due to an
emergency is a greater driving force in the selection of a lender-
convenience of location and hours of operation-than the price of
the loan.209 Lenders are also not always willing to clearly state the
APRs involved,210 although CFSA has made it part of their best prac-
tices to advertise all finance charges clearly and in conformity with
TIIA disclosure requirements z.2 1 Of course, information on prices is
of limited utility to a consumer if the price is the same everywhere.
While observers would expect other entrants into the business to try to
compete on price, payday lenders instead compete with current lend-
ers on location and convenience because borrowers' only real choice
is where to go to get the loan.2 1 2
Even as no competition seems to occur, the profits of lenders
raise eyebrows, and the myth of risky low-income consumers does not
completely support the high costs of payday loans. A paper written by
Mark Flannery and Katherine Samolyk released by the FDIC Center
for Financial Research soon after the 2005 regulations went into place
asked whether the costs of payday lending justified the price .213 Una-
ble to answer the question without making a number of value judg-
ments-such as how many repeat borrowers are too many repeat
borrowers-they did offer the most useful analysis of what drives costs
and profits of payday lenders.
207. Chessin, supra note 11, at 408-09. The Colorado law allowed a finance charge of
20% for the first $300 and 7.5% for the next $200, averaging 15% over the maximum loan
amount of $500. Id. As an indication of the strength in bargaining position of the lenders,
the most frequently borrowed amount was also the most profitable for the lenders-$300.
Id. at 407.
208. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 9-10.
209. BArn, supra note 100, at 29; see also Chessin, supra note 11, at 409 n.93 (describing
borrowers as "rate insensitive"); Schaaf, supra note 20, at 344 (borrowers are not "price
driven").
210. SeeJohnson, supra note 5, at 32. Sending her research assistants into payday lend-
ing outlets, the author found that many stores did not have any written information and
refused to hand over copies of the contracts that customers were signing. Id.
211. Best Practices, supra note 4.
212. Barr, supra note 63, at 157; see also Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 20.
213. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 20.
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CFSA argued to FDIC, which had been unable to find much in-
formation on its own about the profitability of payday lenders, that
due to the operating costs and loan default losses, it would be "impos-
sible" to break even without finance charges around $15 per loan.21 4
Similarly, a study from the 1970s-well before payday lending-
showed that short-term loans required APRs of at least 100% to break
even. 215 The research of FDIC indicates that the cost per $100 of loans
is $14 for young stores and $11 for mature stores. 216 Approximately
three-quarters of those costs are wages, rent, and advertising, while
costs from loan defaults and collection expenses are the final quar-
ter.2 17 Flannery and Samolyk do not dispute that loan loss rates are
relatively low, which provides support for industry claims that defaults
justify high prices. This implies that trying to force payday lenders to
charge less than $15 per loan would limit their ability to open new
stores, even if the more mature stores could survive on lower rates;
however, asking new stores to lose some money at first may be reason-
able given the eventual rates of return.
As one would expect from a business dependent on low margins,
the key determinant of profitability is volume, and the key factor in
volume is how many rollovers and renewals a lender can generate.
Customers who renew their loans are cheaper to serve because they
do not require going through the verification process that new cus-
tomers do.2 18 Renewals also lead to fewer losses because the borrowers
are constantly "paying off' the previous loan.219 The mature stores
bring in greater revenue because they have acquired more customers
who are continually taking out loans. 220 This also explains the lower
costs of mature stores since they have more customers that require less
time from the stores' employees.
214. Id. at 4.
215. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5.
216. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 10-11 (explaining that "young" stores have
been open from one to four years, while "mature" stores have been open at least four
years); see also Barr, supra note 63, at 124 (describing payday loans as having high fixed
costs).
217. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4, at 11.
218. Id. at 17. Even if it only takes twenty minutes to get a new loan, this still takes more
time than simply renewing a loan.
219. Id. at 16. However, an increase in the percentage of renewals also leads to an
increase in defaults. One can assume that borrowers who constantly renew their loans
eventually realize that they are unable to pay it back. This means that the low default rates
of payday loans are not the by-product of counting each loan that is rolled over or renewed
as a series of completed loans.
220. Id. at 2.
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The most interesting finding of the authors, which may derive
from the fact that the high-frequency borrowers were the ones more
likely to default, was that high-frequency borrowers do not increase a
store's profitability per loan, even as they increase store revenue.
221
The key to store profitability, however, was simply the volume of loans
generated, which means that rollovers and renewals are still central to
the industry's profits.222
B. The Payday Lending Industry is Dependent on Repeat
Customers
As the Flannery and Samolyk paper suggests, the payday lending
industry thrives on repeat customers.223 Consumer advocates describe
it as the lifeblood of the industry and acknowledge that strong regula-
tion aimed at limiting repeat borrowing will harm the payday lend-
ers.2 24 As the studies cited in Part I describe, the vast majority of
payday loan consumers are repeat borrowers. From the perspective of
the industry, repeat borrowers are an intricate part of their opera-
tions. A report from Ernst and Young on Canadian payday lending
stores concluded that "[t]he survival of payday loan operators de-
pends on establishing and maintaining a substantial repeat customer
base." 225 In fact, after CFSA instituted its industry best practices, two of
the largest payday lenders in the industry-Dollar Financial and
ACE-withdrew rather than having to comply with provisions that
would have limited the companies' ability to maximize rollovers,
though Dollar Financial has since rejoined CFSA.226 One observer
thought that the underwriting side of the business must assume that
customers will not repay the loans on the first opportunity; one who
221. Id. at 18.
222. Id. at 19. The authors were unable to fully analyze the fairness of profits-even
though the title asks whether they are justified-because they did not have data on how
firm-level costs are spread out among the individual stores. However, they describe the
operating profits as "quite healthy"-with $18.73 per loan made. Id. It is not surprising that
such profits are available at mature stores when they can charge $15 to $20 per $100 of
loan, while costs are only $11.
223. See generally Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 4.
224. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, POLICY BRIEF No. 9, BE WARY- DEPENDENCE ON
DEBT TRAP PRESENTS CHALLENGES FOR EFFECTIVE STATE PAYDAY LENDING REGULATION
(2004), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pb009-BeWaryPayday-
0704.pdf. Not that groups like the Center for Responsible Lending have any qualms about
eliminating payday lending.
225. KING ET AL., supra note 45, at 8.
226. Johnson, supra note 5, at 70. The companies then instituted their own practice of
limiting customers to three rollovers, but critics argued that the companies could get
around their own regulations by describing rollovers as "new" loans. Id.
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needs $300 immediately likely cannot afford a $50 fee out of his or
her next paycheck along with a $300 payment to cover the princi-
pal.2 27 Nor would each loan generate enough profits to cover costs if
each consumer only took out one loan at a time. Most customers do
repay the loans, and lenders do not want to rely on credit histories
because it is always a good risk to bring in new customers to increase
the volume of sales.
Despite the profitability of repeat customers, recent federal and
state regulations prompted CFSA, which represents approximately
half of all payday lenders in the United States, to revise its best prac-
tices.228 As part of a $10 million advertising campaign, CFSA an-
nounced that lenders would begin to offer a payment plan to extend
at least one payday loan per year for up to four pay periods without
any additional fees, no questions asked. 229 Giving people more time to
pay back payday loans would respond to much of the criticism offered
by regulators and consumer advocates; in fact, Don Gayhardt, presi-
dent of Dollar Financial, says that this should greatly reduce the "cy-
cles of debt.''230 Forty-six members of Congress have signed a letter
addressed to Representative Barney Frank, the new Chairman of the
House Financial Services Committee, supporting the changes.231 The
problem, however, that the Consumer Federation of America pointed
out, is that if people are taking out eight or nine loans per year, receiv-
ing an extension on one of them will not eliminate the dangers of the
product.2 32 Even in a state like Florida, where rollovers and taking
227. Barr, supra note 63, at 157.
228. Sue Kirchhoff, Payday Lenders Craft User Protections; Voluntary Guidelines Not Enough
Consumer Advocates Maintain, USA TODAY, Feb. 22, 2007, at Bi. The full details of the plan
are not available to the public, only to members of CFSA; the changes to CFSA's best
practices went into effect July 31, 2007. See Best Practices, supra note 4.
229. Singletary, supra note 52. CFSA disputes that this is just about heading off more
regulation, but rather, about making sure their customers use their products responsibly.
Id. One of the revisions to the best practices is to end advertising payday loans as a means
to "frivolous" ends such as vacations. Kirchhoff, supra note 228. Consumer advocates have
responded to this campaign through a marketing campaign of their own, comparing vari-
ous predatory lenders to natural disasters; the ads are sponsored by the most well-known
consumer advocacy organizations, as well as the Ford Foundation, the NAACP, and the
United Auto Workers. Stuart Elliott, Critics of Lending Practices Adopt a Harder Edge, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at C6.
230. Kirchhoff, supra note 228. The fact that an industry insider would publicly ac-
knowledge the legitimacy of the "cycle of debt" problem demonstrates the current defen-
siveness of the industry.
231. Annys Shin, Payday-Loan Group Tries to Fend Off Restrictions, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2007, at D2.
232. Id.
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loans from multiple lenders is strictly prohibited, customers still take
an average of eight loans per year.2 33
IV. Alternatives to Payday Loans
The payday lending industry is difficult to regulate because such
a thin line exists between wild profitability and extinction. While some
states have succeeded in eradicating payday lending, many simply
want to tame its abusive tendencies. Given that most of the consumers
who continue to use the product-even in high-regulation states such
as Florida-appear to be dependent on it, the promise of regulation
has thus far fallen short. In response to those who argue for a full
prohibition on payday loans, payday loan advocates must realize the
limitations of such a strategy because the demand for short-term
credit will always exist.2 34 While credit practices were unethical and
illegal in the early 1960s, they "persist because [they] fulfill social
functions presently not served by legitimate institutions. '" 235 The same
is true today: if payday lending were illegal, it would become part of
an underground black market.23 6
If an outright ban on payday loans is counter-productive without
something to take its place, what could fulfill that function or at least
limit the harms from payday lending? The more popular suggestions
include strengthening the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"),
having credit unions and banks offer competing products, and contin-
uing to tighten state regulation.
A. Strengthening CRA
One goal that has largely been met is to enforce the CRA so that
banks receive lower ratings from federal regulators if they partner
with payday lenders. Congress passed the CRA in 1977 for the purpose
of ensuring that federally-insured institutions met the credit needs of
233. See KING ET AL., supra note 45.
234. See Covert, supra note 166. One of the groups against reauthorizing payday lend-
ing in Georgia is the Georgia Industrial Loan Association, which represents loan install-
ment operators that charge much higher rates than payday loans for another type of short-
term loan, and stands to lose profits if payday lenders can return. Also, the payday lending
industry claims that hundreds of thousands of people from Georgia go into neighboring
states each year to take out payday loans. Id.
235. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 45, at 669 (quoting DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY
MORE: THE CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 180 (1963)).
236. Hackett, supra note 48; see also Covert, supra note 166 (describing how payday
lenders in Georgia claim that loan installment operators charging even higher prices have
replaced payday loans as the short-term credit product of choice after the state banned
payday lenders).
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all members of their communities. 237 Regulators examine banks based
on three criteria: lending, including how frequently different income
groups receive loans; services, meaning whether banks provide mar-
keting and technical support to the communities; and banks' invest-
ments in the community.238 The banks then receive ratings from the
applicable federal regulator that impact how often they receive fur-
ther evaluations and whether they will receive approval for any expan-
sions or mergers.239 Between 1993 and 1999, a Treasury Department
study found that the CRA-covered depository institutions made almost
$800 billion in home mortgage, small business, and community devel-
opment loans to lower-income persons and communities. 240 The
greater commitment to low-and moderate-income communities has
begun to create a "virtuous lending cycle." 24 1 The CRA is not fully
responsible for greater financial services in these communities-eco-
nomic growth, low interest rates, and technological innovation,
among others factors, have had an impact-but the rating system can
help push banks into, or away from, certain activities. 242
As federal regulators increasingly criticize payday lending, a bank
taking part in payday lending partnerships will face low-CRA rat-
ings;2 43 in fact, the 2005 FDIC regulations promised just that as a seri-
ous incentive to leave the rent-a-bank practice behind.2 44 The
question that follows is whether the CRA services evaluations can in-
clude whether banks are providing products to compete with payday
lenders-supplying their clients products and services that will reduce
the need to use short-term, high-cost payday loans. First, asking banks
to create new products that may not be profitable would involve a
237. Chin, supra note 10, at 750.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Michael Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five Opportunities for the
Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'y 447,
449 (2002). Barr describes some of the efforts by banks and thrifts under the CRA, includ-
ing: forming Community Development Corporations that aim to reduce risks and share
information about lending to low-income communities; investing in Community Develop-
ment Financial Institutions ("CDFIs") that aim to take advantage of these markets; market-
ing to targeted communities; offering flexible marketing to try to make credit available to a
larger group of potential borrowers; and funding credit counseling to aid future borrow-
ers. Id. at 450.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 451.
243. FDIC Guidelines, supra note 60. Both Chin, supra note 10, at 750-51, and Barr,
supra note 240, at 461-62, argued this would be an important part of federal regulations to
help low-income consumers stop using payday lenders.
244. FDIC Guidelines, supra note 60.
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new, vigorous enforcement of the CRA. Second, it is not clear yet what
products would successfully keep consumers from using payday lend-
ers. After all, people who use payday loans have bank accounts, but
they choose, when they need immediate cash, not to use their banks.
The new chair of FDIC, Shelia Blair, stated publicly that FDIC is work-
ing to draft guidelines to give banks more credit for offering products
to low-income consumers that would compete with payday loans.2 45
B. Bank and Credit Union Efforts to Offer Competing Products
A number of credit unions and banks have responded to the mar-
ket and developed products to compete with payday lenders, theo-
rizing that customers use payday lenders because a "competitive
vacuum" exists that banks and credit unions could fill with the right
product.246 A key point to bridging the banking gap was to provide
deposit-secured emergency loans to those unable to qualify for tradi-
tional credit. 247 It would be feasible with the use of credit-scoring as
well as with technologies that limit administrative costs; the banks
could partner with community organizations to create accounts from
which to draw. 248 More people would then use their depository institu-
tions for all their financial needs instead of supplementing their
checking accounts with payday lenders. The Center for Responsible
Lending identifies the characteristics of a responsible small loan for
mainstream institutions: at least ninety days for repayment, the ability
to pay in installments, no personal check mechanisms, limits on re-
newals, consideration of borrower's ability to repay, and no
mandatory arbitration clauses. 24 9
The problem with these ideas, and with other existing credit
products is that they offer less in terms of convenience and privacy.
They become less attractive to many consumers, who only use them as
supplements to regular payday loans. Or, if not sufficiently stringent,
they become another product to be abused and lead people into cy-
cles of debt. These superior products should be offered because they
are simply better for the consumer than payday loans, but the charac-
teristics that make them attractive to consumer advocates and banking
institutions limit their ability to pull people away from payday loans.
245. Sue Kirchhoff, Efforts Renewed to Control Excessive Costs of Payday Loans, USA TODAY,
Dec. 1, 2006, at B5.
246. WOODSTOCK INST., REINVESTMENT ALERT No. 16, AFFORDABLE ALTERNATIVES TO PAY-
DAY LOANS 1 (2001), available at http://woodstockinst.org/document/alertl6.pdf.
247. Carr & Scheutz, supra note 63, at 22.
248. Id.
249. ROBINSON, supra note 79.
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Credit unions that have tried to wean their members off payday
loans with better products by offering very attractive loan terms, some-
times with strings attached, have noticed that people abuse the better
products. ASI Federal Credit Union in Louisiana created the Stretch
Plan, which offers a line of credit at 12% with a maximum amount of
$500, or $1000 after the individual has successfully used the program
for a period of time, and a $4 per week fee for membership in the
plan.250 The borrower must pay back the loan in two equal install-
ments starting with the second payday after the loan, giving the bor-
rower more time to recover from the emergency that required
immediate cash than the two weeks of the traditional payday loan.25 '
The credit union made 8000 such loans in 2004, with a charge-off rate
of only 0.35 to 0.37%, and almost one-third of the credit union's oper-
ating income is from the program.2
52
Another long-standing program is the Salary Advance Loan pro-
gram ("SALO") that the North Carolina State Employees Credit
Union ("NCSECU") offers, the second biggest credit union in the
country.25 3 The terms of the loans they offer to credit union members
are: an APR of 12% with a maximum balance of $500, translating to a
charge of less than $2.50 on a $500 two-week loan; and the borrower
must pay back the full loan on the next payday through automatic
deposit.2 54 The credit union recently added a forced savings compo-
nent to the terms that requires 5% of each loan to be put into a sav-
ings account, which resulted in $6 million in new deposits. 255 SALO
began with a mandatory education component, but it was unpopular,
and people chose payday lenders over the credit union program.256
Like the Stretch Plan, SALO is very profitable with charge-offs of only
0.24%.257 In fact, the loan loss rate is so low that when NCSECU
presents the details of the product to other credit unions to en-
courage them to offer similar loans, they artificially inflate the loss
rate to 4% because they found that other credit unions did not believe
250. BAIR, supra note 100, at 23, The ASI plan, created in 1999, is one of the oldest
credit union plans. Originally, the plan included a $3 weekly fee and an APR of 18%.
WooDsTocK INST., supra note 246.
251. BMaR, supra note 100, at 23-24.
252. Id.
253. Stegman & Fars, supra note 2, at 28.
254. BAIR, supra note 100, at 21.
255. Id. at 21-22.
256. Id.
257. Id. The program reports that most losses come from customers with FICO scores
of 540 or less. Id.
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their data.2 58 Both ASI and NCSECU worry, however, that recurrent
use is what drives profitability. 2 59 They are trying to determine how to
limit it and do not want to create cycles of debt similar to payday
lenders. 260
Other credit union plans offer a similar structure of fees and re-
quirements. The Faith Community United Credit Union's Grace Loan
Program in Cleveland charges a fee of $15 per loan up to $500 with an
APR of 17%.261 Customers pay back the loans within two pay periods,
which allows for two rollovers of $15 each, considerably less than the
rollover fee of a similar loan from a payday lender.262 Borrowers also
need to attend credit counseling and save $10 with each repay-
ment.263 North Side Community Federal Credit Union ("NSCFCU")
in Chicago offers the Payday Alternative Loan ("PAL"), with a loan
maximum of $500, an interest rate of 16.5%, a one-time $30 applica-
tion fee, and loans that credit union members pay back in six monthly
installments. 2 64 Those with low credit scores are eligible, but, below
580, members must attend multiple financial workshops. 2 65 Although
the program is only open to members, someone can join the credit
union and receive a loan in twenty minutes. 266 This is an admirable
attempt by the credit union to compete with payday lenders on conve-
nience. 267 Although still in its early stages, the program is running at a
loss and requires grants to continue to cover the product, raising
questions about its long-term viability even as it saves members money
258. Kirchhoff, supra note 21.
259. Id.
260. BAIR, supra note 100, at 22-24. Those who run the Stretch Plan are trying to deter-
mine how more of its members can "graduate" to asset-building programs. Shirk, supra
note 16, at 26. Also, NCSECU is now the largest payday lender in North Carolina, serving
40,000 people a month. Kirchhoff, supra note 21. Considering that the State has driven out
all of the large payday lenders, it probably does not have a lot of competition.
261. Faith Cmty. Credit Union, Products and Services, http://www.faithcommcu.org/
113.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
262. WOODSTOCK INST., supra note 246, at 3-4. The Grace Loan Program is a relatively
small program and has a charge-off rate of 0.49% of loans closed, according to data from
1999 to 2000. Id. There does not appear to be any updated information since this publica-
tion, but the credit union's website still lists the program as offered under its list of prod-
ucts. Faith Cmty. Credit Union, Products and Services, http://www.faithcommcu.org/
113.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
263. Faith Cmty. Credit Union, supra note 262.
264. BAR, supra note 100, at 22.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 22-23.
267. Shirk, supra note 16, at 25.
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in comparison to payday loans.268 Those who run the plan hope that
despite its costs they can use it to teach people better lending prac-
tices and to make long-term financial plans.
26 9
Products that aim to compete with payday loans have to strike a
balance between trying to teach people better habits and offering con-
venience. For alternative products to be successful and reach a wide
market, they must offer flexibility and convenience, while at the same
time limiting the potential credit risk from the loan.2 70 Today approxi-
mately 1000 of the 9000 credit unions in the United States offer prod-
ucts to compete with payday loans, but they have had very little impact
on the payday loan business.2 7 1 While some of the loans are very suc-
cessful, most community-service products, such as PAL at NSCFCU,
struggle to break even. 272 Unfortunately, the best products, such as
the SALO in North Carolina and the Stretch Plan in New Orleans, can
be habit-forming and are often abused by consumers, either as a re-
placement for payday loans or as a supplement to them. 27 3 As much as
these lenders want to try to offer their consumers financial education,
like the NCSECU originally did with SALO, most people would rather
use payday loans than participate in educational programs. If the bor-
rower is willing to jump through the necessary hoops, these products
are certainly less expensive for the consumer; but, as long as people
want money without those types of hassles, loan products offered by
credit unions are not a complete answer to the demand for emer-
gency funds. 274
Because of the number of customers they already serve, banks are
in an excellent position to develop credit products that would com-
pete with payday loans. Two Chicago banks recently started offering
products that they hope customers will use instead of payday loans.
268. Id. The program received a $20,000 grant from a bank that wanted to boost its
ratings under the CRA. Id.
269. Id.
270. WOODSTOCK INST., supra note 246, at 5-6. According to the Woodstock Institute,
flexibility is possible when the people to whom the credit unions are offering loans are
members with some minimum experience at the credit union and a direct deposit account
there as well. Id. To reduce credit risk, proof of employment should be required, and the
credit union will probably need to maintain a loan loss reserve, possibly working with a
local bank or community organization. Id.
271. Kirchhoff, supra note 21.
272. Id.
273. BAIR, supra note 100, at 32-33; Stegman & Faris, supra note 2, at 28.
274. I concede that if payday loans were outlawed entirely, like the military prohibition
on payday loans, these products from banks and credit unions would be in a much better
position to attract people, but it is also likely a black market would exist for a more conve-
nient product.
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Austin Bank of Chicago offers Ready Cash Now, which is a fixed loan
from $300 to $999.99 with an APR of 11.99% repaid over twelve
months through automatic deductions. 275 The bank has advertised
the product through community and church groups and hopes that
the product will bring in the unbanked, who will eventually transition
to using regular banking services.2 76 La Salle Bank in Chicago has
started offering small loans that are only available in the case of an
emergency. 277 The loan has a maximum amount of $1000, an APR of
12%, a maximum loan term of twelve months, and, most importantly,
stringent application requirements including a three-month financial
education program. 278 This loan is not meant to be a pure payday
loan alternative, but rather, a chance to learn how to handle one's
finances.279
The other method by which banks can compete against payday
lenders is through overdraft protection charges. As described earlier,
payday lenders justify their fees by comparing their prices against
other charges a person faces when short on cash. One such fee is the
bank overdraft charge, which is often just as expensive, if not more
expensive, than a payday loan without a rollover. Overdraft charges
benefit the consumer by not requiring any unnecessary face-to-face
interactions and by being predictable; if they were structured in a way
that allowed people to pay them back easily, such as payment plans,
customers might feel more comfortable using them.280 Controversy
exists, however, over the costs of these penalties-the average fee for
an overdraft is $20.50-and whether the disclosures to customers are
sufficiently accurate and clear.281 When users of payday loans say that
they know the prices are high, but at least no hidden fees exist, this is
an indictment of mainstream banking practices. 282
Federal and state regulators, however, have not turned their at-
tention to overdraft fees. The banks themselves may offer the best ex-
planation of why no backlash to overdraft fees has occurred; overdraft
275. BAIR, supra note 100, at 25.
276. Id.
277. id.
278. Id. at 25-26.
279. Id.
280. Barr, supra note 63, at 163-64. Most banks give a person thirty days to pay back the
charges from an overdraft, which is better than the two weeks for payday loans, but maybe
not enough time to persuade many people to use them. Id.
281. Id. at 163-64, 178.
282. Barr, for instance, is skeptical that creating better banking products is enough to
bring people into banks for all of their financial needs because of a general distrust of
banks. Id. at 132 n.22.
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fees are one-time events. Without the cycle-of-debt stories to prompt
regulation, overdraft fees do not receive much attention. Despite the
costs, overdraft protection with transparent fees structured to help
low-income consumers could provide a real alternative to payday
loans.
C. Tightening State Regulations
While banks and credit unions have tried to create demand for
their products, states have enacted regulations attempting to change
the terms of the supply of payday loans. The limited evidence is un-
clear as to whether even the strictest limitations on payday loans pro-
tect consumers. Consumer advocates believe that payday lenders will
continue to find ways to evade state regulations and undermine the
benefits of moderate approaches to regulating payday loans.28 3 The
manner in which lenders maximized profits with the Colorado De-
ferred Deposit law-promoting $300 loans because those had the
highest interest rates per $100 loaned-is an example of utilizing
loopholes.2 84 In Florida, while most companies are complying with
state law, some lenders evade state regulation by going to the Internet
or by claiming that the Florida law, as written, only includes payday
lenders that demand a post-dated check and not those who have cus-
tomers sign a promissory note giving them access to their checking
account. 285 Even tough regulation may not limit frequent usage of
payday loans, like customers in Florida using almost the same number
of payday loans per year as customers in less regulated states.
286
For regulatory systems to work, resources are necessary for en-
forcement. Evidence from various surveys of payday lenders indicates
they are not always forthcoming with all the information that they
must provide under the law, nor do they always fulfill regulatory re-
quirements. 287 While states such as North Carolina have been aggres-
sive in removing payday lenders when the charter authorizing them
expires, one has to wonder whether the many states that have allowed
payday lenders to operate have the political will to enforce regula-
283. See CRL 2005, supra note 14.
284. See supra Part III.A.
285. Burnett, supra note 156.
286. The Graves and Peterson article, however, describes fewer payday loan outlets per
capita in Florida, which may reflect that state's tougher regulation. See Graves & Peterson,
supra note 25, at 741.
287. Id. at 664-65 (citing data about violations of payday lending laws in North Caro-
lina and Texas); Johnson, supra note 5, at 32-36.
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tions. 28 8 Though most users of payday loans want to see prices go
down, they do not want their ability to use payday lenders limited by
government regulation. 28 9 The group with the most incentive to limit
payday lending practices that go beyond what the law allows seems
disinterested in advocating for government regulation. Customers do
not see themselves primarily as payday loan borrowers whose role it is
to watch over the lenders, so they are unlikely to expend their limited
political energy and resources to press for enforcement. Consumer
advocates also face an uphill battle ensuring that state legislative and
executive branches provide enough money and manpower to this is-
sue compared to policymakers' myriad other concerns.
Online payday lending is another long-term problem that may
undermine the chances of state regulatory success. As the largest loop-
hole in state regulatory schemes, lenders use electronic fund transfers
through offshore banks to put cash in the hands of consumers and
debit the consumers' accounts when the loan comes due.290 CFSA
cites this problem to support state-created safe-harbor laws so that at
least consumers can use products that states can control through regu-
lation. 291 But any regulation that is too stringent or that places limits
on how often a consumer can take a loan may result in customers
using online lenders and creating their own cycles of debt outside of
the reach of regulation.
The alternatives in place so far have not been successful in limit-
ing the risks to consumers who use payday loans. The competing
products banks offer either become payday loans with different names
or are too limited to make a dent in the industry, while attempts to
regulate payday loan lenders have had limited success in reducing de-
pendence on payday loans. In general, those who critique payday
loans have not given enough weight to how much consumers under-
stand the risks of payday loans and to why borrowers continue to use
them. Payday loans are easy to obtain and compete well with other
high-cost products like overdraft protection, at least in the short-run.
The customers are primarily attracted to the convenience and privacy
that the loans offer though. The risks of payday loans must be bal-
288. Press Release, Office of Roy Cooper, N.C. Attorney Gen. (Mar. 1, 2006), http://
www.ncdoj.com/Documen tStreamerClient?directory=PressReleases/&file=paydaylenders3.
06.pdf.
289. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 4, at 34-35.
290. Shirk, supra note 16, at 28.
291. Cmrty. Fin. Servs. Ass'n of Am., supra note 145.
[Vol. 42
anced against the strong demand and the benefits that consumers see
in the product.
V. The Solution: Bring in the Legitimate Banks
The alternative to regulating payday loan lenders is to change the
supplier of the product, rather than just change the terms of it. Large
banks stay out of the very profitable and relatively low-risk payday
lending business primarily because of the appearance of impropriety
due to the high interest rates of the product.29 2 Whether the loans are
from the black market or from hard-to-regulate businesses like cur-
rent payday lenders, as long as people need emergency funds, transac-
tions like payday loans will exist. If states were willing, they could
invite banks-possibly through tax breaks that would encourage ex-
pansion into low-income neighborhoods-to offer payday loans at
terms that would allow more customers to pay back loans without rol-
lovers or borrowing from one lender to pay another. The key to this
working is allowing the banks to compete on convenience, a change
that will require state and federal regulators to relax some lending
requirements for small loans. Banks that engage in payday lending
will be easier to monitor, easier to regulate, and intensely interested in
protecting their reputations.
A. Why Do the Banks Stay Away?
The primary reason banks do not enter the payday loan business
is that they do not want to risk harming their reputation by appearing
to exploit their customers. 2 93 As long as banks need to offer loans at
high interest rates compared to credit cards and other loans, public
policy officials, the media, and consumer advocates will criticize
them.2 94 As Michael A. Stegman, expert on payday loans and profes-
sor at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, said:
A company like Bank of America knows they're missing out on a
multi-billion dollar business and they know that if they got into this
and charged 60 percent even, it would still be a significant savings
for consumers. But they don't want to make their reputation on
undercutting a payday lender.295
292. See infra Part V.A.
293. See Michelle Leder, How the Other Half Banks: The Depressing, Amazing 'Payday Loan'
Business, SLATE.COM, May 10, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2100276/.
294. BMAR, supra note 100, at 10.
295. Leder, supra note 293.
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The issues with such loans do not outweigh the potential profits
to be earned at the expense of the community.296 Banks think either
this is a dirty business or that it looks enough like a dirty business that
they best stay away.2 9 7
Banks cannot make a profit without charging what they view as
"extremely high interest rates." 298 As examined earlier, the margins,
especially for new payday lenders, are thin. Profits would probably re-
main thin for the banks, which would require them to offer products
much less likely to tie people down to repeat borrowing. The issue of
exactly how banks might be able to cut costs will be addressed further
in the next section, assuming interest rates will remain relatively high,
certainly higher than what banks charge currently for traditional fi-
nancial products, the interest rates will be what attract attention from
the media and federal regulations.
While banks perceive recent regulation of payday loans by FDIC
and other regulators as signs that they would never approve such
products, regulators have consistently, but quietly, said that they
would like to see more products that compete directly with payday
loans. Interviews with the major banking and credit regulators indi-
cated that they would view "low-cost, properly-structured" alternatives
to payday loans as positive, and banks would receive credit under the
CRA for such products. 299
What generates problematic media attention is that the structure
of payday loans encourages rollovers or taking loans out from multi-
ple lenders, creating cycles of debt. Banks could structure payday loan
products that allow for reasonable repayment dates, so that people
have time to recover from the emergency that caused them to use
payday loans in the first place. 300 They could also take their cues from
296. Hackett, supra note 48, at 56.
297. However, Wall Street has earned profits from the industry when it has had the
chance. While a large national bank like Citibank does not offer payday loans, Citigroup
helped to underwrite the initial public offerings ("IPOs") for Dollar Financial, a significant
payday lender. Leder, supra note 293. To the extent that banks fear public perception of
payday loans, my own anecdotal experience supports the view that most people associate
payday loans with exploitation of the poor. Everyone to whom I mentioned the topic of
this Article offered immediate comments along the lines of "that's a dirty business."
298. BAIR, supra note 100, at 10.
299. Id. at 4. Sheila Bair is now one of the major regulators, chair of FDIC, and has
followed this Article on payday lending by saying that FDIC would work to create incentives
for banks to create such products. Kirchhoff, supra note 245.
300. See supra Part I (concerning testimony at the Liebermen forum concluding that
families could not pay back a payday loan in two weeks and still meet its other financial
obligations).
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Florida and have automatic grace periods available to people who are
unable to make payments. 30 1 Whatever banks choose to do, as long as
their primary goal is to prevent cycles of debt, federal regulators
should give them more leeway to charge high prices. After all, banks
are charging similar rates for overdraft protection-a product that is
more likely to be used by low-income consumers. In order to cover
their costs, banks will almost certainly need to charge high fees for
their loans so they can offer a product that can compete on conve-
nience with payday lenders. 30 2 If they do not succeed in offering a
convenient product, larger banks will not make a dent in this market.
In the end, the same reasons banks stay out of the payday loan
market now-concerns about their reputations and good business
practices-are exactly why banks should be the ones to offer payday
loans.
B. How Banks as Payday Lenders Would Work
For banks to offer payday loans, they need to identify their poten-
tial costs, politicians need to realize that banks can offer products with
lower risks to consumers, and federal regulators need to relax stan-
dards regarding acceptable credit risks.
The problem of payday loans dates back to ancient times, but his-
tory also provides a solution: United States lawmakers addressed a sim-
ilar problem early in the twentieth century by passing laws
encouraging legitimate lenders to offer products that consumers were
able to afford.303 The earliest evidence of financial arrangements like
payday loans dates back to early civilizations in Mesopotamia and the
Mediterranean where people pledged future earnings or products in
exchange for immediate cash.304 Like today, they started as short term
loans but could compound to unreasonable rates over time.30 5 In the
late 1800s and early 1900s, "salary lenders" offered money against a
borrower's next paycheck, while "salary buyers" purchased the next
301. See supra Part II.B.
302. Realistically, the federal regulators will need to be convinced of the need for high
interest rates. Right now, they would not support interest rates higher than what credit
cards can offer. BAIR, supra note 100, at 30.
303. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 45, at 621.
304. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 665. The authors, who are primarily inter-
ested in the relationship between payday lending and the military, also cite evidence of a
relationship between soldiers and lenders in ancient Rome and ancient China, as well as
during the American Civil War. Id. at 666-69.
305. Id. at 665.
Winter 2008] PAYDAY LENDING
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
paycheck in exchange for immediate cash. 30 6 The rates on these ille-
gal transactions were equivalent to contemporary payday loans: APRs
in the hundreds of percents.30 7 They targeted those on fixed incomes
who were not easily able to skip town, which sounds similar to the
charges levied today against payday lenders by consumer advocates.
308
To avoid usury laws, the lenders relied on the fiction that they were
"buying" the future wages, or they would create sham transactions-
just as payday lenders in early 1990s said their transactions were not
loans and not subject to usury laws-but courts treated them as
loans.309
Society took notice of this problem, especially when stories ap-
peared in the newspaper-remarkably similar to the ones that appear
regularly today-describing how a borrower could pay hundreds of
dollars without ever paying down the original debt.3 10 The solution
reformers advocated was to attract "legitimate business" with a high
enough rate of return to be worth their while, but subject them to
strict regulation and severe penalties for violations of the law.3 1 1 By
the middle of the Twentieth Century, every state but Arkansas had
enacted a small loan law that gave banks an exception to the usury
laws for small loans.312 The maximum rate for the Model Law used in
many states, which was a compromise between the reformers and the
lenders, was 42%.313
Forty-two percent is obviously a much better rate than payday
lenders are offering today and a much lower rate than what is realistic
for banks to offer; the average "small" loan size was much larger than
today's payday loans. In 1930, the average small loan was $140,314
which translates to over $1700 in 2007. Therefore, those banks could
offer interest rates close to what credit cards offer today, unlike to-
day's "small" loans-the payday loans-which require much higher
interest rates to cover costs. The logic of the small loan laws still ap-
plies today, albeit at higher interest rates, to bring a more legitimate,
easily-regulated entity to the business. The small loan laws also demon-
306. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 45, at 618.
307. Id. at 619.
308. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 669-70.
309. Chessin, supra note 11, at 392; Johnson, supra note 5, at 18-25.
310. Graves & Peterson, supra note 25, at 670-71. The term "loan shark" originated in
reference to the salary lenders. Id.
311. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 45, at 621.
312. Id. (noting that Arkansas's constitution had an interest rate ceiling).
313. Joseph Henry Cohen, Book Review, 45 YALE L.J. 192, 194-95 (1935) (reviewing
Louis N. ROBINSON & ROLF NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BUSINESS (1935)).
314. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 45, at 621.
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strate the wisdom of trying to prevent such lending from going under-
ground. As stated previously, short-term, high-cost lending in some
form will always exist because a need will always exist; keeping such
lending out in the open is imperative to examining and regulating it
when appropriate.
Payday lenders would respond to this analogy by pointing out
that unlike lenders a hundred years ago, they are legitimate, law-abid-
ing businesses, often authorized by the states, that do not deserve to
be eliminated. While it is true that payday lenders generally abide by
the laws and their own best practices, the question remains whether
the risks to the consumer from payday loans are risks that society
wants to assume. Payday lenders currently offer a product that is ex-
tremely difficult to pay back on the day it is due. The goal of this
proposal is to find a middle ground where consumers could access
short-term credit, but with a lower likelihood of needing to go further
in debt, as was the legislators' goal who passed the small loan laws.
Whether this would force payday lenders out of business or force
them to offer products with longer terms to pay back the loans is less
important than the details of the products available on the market.
Like the legislators of the early twentieth century, state legislators
should pass bills with the same goals in mind, turning the short-term
lending business over to an industry that can offer products that peo-
ple can afford and still turn a profit.
Whether reputable banks will be allowed to offer payday lending
products is primarily a political question, and not one that this Article
analyzes at great length. First, federal regulators need to voice their
support for such products being offered by banks.315 Second, state
legislators, who now have greater control over the industry than ever
before, need to reach a consensus that if they allow payday lending,
they would rather have banks offering the product. Considering that
over thirty states have created safe harbors to allow such loans, politi-
cians preferring that banks offer payday loans instead of other corpo-
rations is not unthinkable. If the banks researched the potential costs
of running such programs and earned approval from federal regula-
tors, they could go to the states' legislative bodies and ask that the safe
harbors be altered to give the banks an advantage by creating mini-
mum interest rates that would match the costs of the products that the
banks wanted to offer.
315. BAIR, supra note 100, at 35. They will also need to come around on my primary
argument that high cost should be permissible as long as the structure of the loan is not
likely to induce cycles of debt.
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Banks may be able to undercut payday lenders through limits on
APRs. But even if lower fees per loan were impossible, banks could
still meet structural standards for loans that payday lenders could not.
Any APR banks charged would be higher than the 36% that credit
card companies can charge for a cash advance 316 and would likely
need to be in the triple digits. An exact interest rate scheme would
depend largely on the banks' anticipated costs though. In order to
compete with the payday lenders, instead of just offering a better
product to a few people, banks may need to open new locations.
Whether enough banks exist in low-income neighborhoods is uncer-
tain, because everyone who uses payday loans has found their way to
one. But to become a convenient option, banks may need to open
more locations and potentially keep longer hours.
States could offer tax breaks to encourage banks to open more
locations in low-income areas. Or, banks could operate stand-alone
outlets of major banks that offer a different mix of products that are
more appealing to low-income consumers. 317 The level of expansion
necessary to take over the payday lending market will likely be in-
versely proportional to how much better the bank's product is than
the current payday lenders' product. The idea could help payday loan
customers become more comfortable with products that mainstream
credit institutions offer. Ideally, bank employees would be able to sug-
gest other credit options when appropriate and encourage customers
to use less expensive credit.318
The banks also need to examine how to expand, whether they
will need to hire more employees and train employees differently. The
salary of a full-time bank employee will likely be higher than that of an
employee for a payday lender because the bank will demand more
from its employees who represent the company to the public. On the
other hand, banks have an advantage because they already have an
established infrastructure. The cost of comprehensive payday lending
for banks is very unclear without knowing how seamlessly the banks
will be able to integrate the product into their existing operations.
While it is unclear how the costs will balance out, the banks should
take all of this into account when estimating what they need to charge
to consumers.
316. Id. at 30.
317. Barr, supra note 240, at 467.
318. Customers do value the anonymity of payday lending, though, and may not appre-
ciate a bank employee's interest in their borrowing habits when they have a short-term
need.
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Structurally, great variety can exist in how the bank schedules
payments of loans. The products must either provide a borrower mul-
tiple pay periods through which they can build up sufficient funds to
pay back the loan or allow the borrower to pay back the debt in install-
ments or through automatic deductions over a few months, as some
alternatives to payday loans currently do.3 19 Unlike payday lenders,
banks could allow partial payments, and consumers who make those
payments could be able to build credit because banks could report
those payments to credit agencies. As long as consumers have a much
more realistic chance of paying back the loan, they will accept the
product.
The hardest part of this proposal for banks will be matching the
convenience of payday loans. For good reason, banks want to be confi-
dent that the people to whom they lend money will be able to pay it
back. If banks require the same information for these loans that they
require of current small loans, customers will continue to choose local
or Internet payday lenders. Ideally, the people to whom the loans are
made will already have accounts with the banks, so the banks should
have significant information about the borrower before the customer
requests a loan. The banks, though, will need to lower their require-
ments for lending money, and federal regulators will need to allow
this to occur.
The 2005 FDIC regulations that prevented rent-a-bank arrange-
ments demanded that banks engaged in payday lending have capital
to cover 100% of outstanding loans. 320 Though it is unclear exactly
how difficult it would be for banks to do this-it may depend on the
volume of the loans-such a requirement appears unnecessary given
the consistently low default rates of payday loans. Losses make up ap-
proximately one-quarter of the cost of operations for payday lenders,
but that is more a reflection of the low overhead for these businesses
than particularly high default rates. The default rates on payday loans,
after all, are still lower than they are for credit cards.
319. The Center for Responsible Lending believes that consumers should have ninety
days to pay back a loan, ERNST ET AL., supra note 16, at 7, although three pay periods or six
weeks may be enough. The banks should have the burden, however, of demonstrating that
a borrower at the rates they will charge can realistically save enough to pay back the loan if
required to make a lump sum payment. Sheila Bair, who summarized many of the alterna-
tive loan products in her piece, worried that many consumers prefer the payday system to
an installment plan; people like the "certainty and the finite nature" of the schedule. BAIR,
supra note 100, at 31. Automatic deductions, where the consumer does not need to worry
about remembering to pay another bill, may alleviate this problem.
320. See supra Part II.A.
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While payday loans are certainly riskier than other loans, the loss
rates are very reasonable. Reputable banks would have an advantage
because they would be able to spread the risk over all their prod-
ucts. 321 Given the fifteen year history of the legal payday loan industry
operating without any financial crises, the financial model appears
sound. The risk analysis that underlies FDIC's concerns about payday
lending appears to be wrong. While it makes sense that these borrow-
ers-who often have had credit problems in the past-are very high
credit risks, in practice, default rates for payday loans and similar
products that credit unions offer are very low. 3 22 The amounts in-
volved in payday loans are possibly much smaller than previous lines
of credit with which borrowers have had problems. Whatever the rea-
son, both banks and regulators should reevaluate their understanding
of risks in light of the industry's history. Regulators, wary of allowing
such risks, will have to choose between the existence of payday loans
as they are now-dragging people further into debt-or allowing this
experiment in high-cost, somewhat riskier loans from banks, for the
benefit of consumers.
Banks must maintain the convenience of payday loans, which re-
quires certain compromises. Banks need to expand their business so
that customers can find lenders in their own neighborhoods. Politi-
cians need to ask banks to replace payday lenders, while providing
them with the statutory approval to offer APRs above what banks nor-
mally charge. Regulators must recognize that the costs of small loans
require higher interest rates and easier access to credit than normally
allowed, and that the practice of payday lending-if it is properly
structured to allow consumers an opportunity to pay back their
debts-should be a positive business practice under the CRA. If all of
this occurs, then low-income consumers could access credit they want,
and perhaps need, but with conditions that give consumers a fair
chance to meet the terms of the loans and make their own financial
decisions.
VI. Obstacles to Implementing Payday Loan Alternatives
This Article aimed to offer another alternative in the debate over
payday loans. A number of difficulties may exist with this proposal,
however, relating to the costs to banks of operating payday loan pro-
grams as well as the political fallout. Some of these potential problems
321. BAIR, supra note 100, at 3.
322. See supra Part III.A.
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can be addressed based on prior experience with payday loans, but
others require more information about the costs of banking or the
details of laws that would encourage banks to engage in payday
lending.3 23
Skeptics should question whether it is possible to make a profit-
especially a profit worthy of banks' resources compared to other op-
portunities-without frequent rollovers. The evidence thus far indi-
cates that payday lenders are incredibly dependent on rollovers, or, at
the very least, the volume driven by repeat customers. 324 The best evi-
dence that banks can make a profit is from the competing products
offered by credit unions. The Stretch Loan that the ASI Credit Union
in New Orleans offers ($4 weekly fee; loans at 12% APR) requires a
half payment on the second payday after the loan, so up to four weeks
after the loan, much longer than the two weeks required by the aver-
age payday lender. Even with terms favorable to borrowers, the credit
union thinks it is making too much money from the product. 325 Banks
should be able to create loan products with favorable terms to them-
selves and their customers. The ASI Stretch plan illustrates that pro-
viding a welcome service can be very profitable. Hopefully, the media
and consumer advocates will provide a check, though, by ensuring
that the banks are not making exorbitant profits by taking advantage
of the customers.
This proposal would also generate hostility from two powerful in-
terest groups: CFSA (the payday lending industry trade group) and
consumer advocates. Obviously, CFSA would be very upset if regula-
tors, the banking industry, and state legislators worked together to put
them out of business. Consumer advocates see CFSA as a powerful
force that is able to push through safe harbor legislation in a majority
of states. But recent events offer a contrary view: North Carolina tak-
ing the opportunity to eliminate payday loans when the law authoriz-
ing them expired, and the Georgia law making payday lending
impossible indicate that CFSA's clout has limits. 3 26 Payday lending in-
323. This section does not address the issue of convenience as it is addressed at length
in Part V. However, it cannot be emphasized enough how this idea is for naught without
approval from regulators to allow banks to provide simpler approval processes before pro-
viding short-term loans to their customers.
324. See supra Part III.B.
325. People have little incentive to avoid this debt when they need access to money
because it is so cheap to stay in the loan program. The weekly fee is relatively low, but
brings in a lot of revenue for ASI.
326. See supra note 166 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of how the indus-
try has almost succeeded in changing the law in Georgia.
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terest groups were also unable to prevent the ban on military payday
lending. Analyzing the politics of each state's decision on whether to
ban payday lending or allow it in a regulated form is beyond the scope
of this Article, so it is difficult to discern a trend.327 Certainly, though,
while the payday lending industry is influential, it is not all-powerful.
Consumer advocates may be particularly upset by this idea as well.
They have never been in a better position to argue for the prohibition
of payday lending now that it appears that states can have an impact
on the industry through legislation. While they see an opportunity to
eliminate payday loans, history indicates that expensive, short-term
credit will never truly go away. Perhaps consumer advocates would
prefer a product that significantly reduces the chances of cycles of
debt over what exists now, even if the product remains expensive.
Moreover, the widespread availability of this credit would only provide
further support for a federal prohibition on online payday lending.
Banks will have to worry about upsetting the consumer advocates as
well because front-page stories about banks taking advantage of vul-
nerable customers will be bad publicity. The banks would be wise to
make a good-faith effort to work with consumer advocates on structur-
ing the loan products to reduce dependency.
Finally, and possibly the largest obstacle to this proposal, banks
may not want to cannibalize their lucrative revenue stream from over-
draft protection. Revenues from overdraft protection fees currently
account for 11% to 41% of pretax revenue for the twenty-five banks
with assets over $2 billion that generate the most income from over-
draft fees, while for all banks, insufficient funds fees represent 18% of
net operating income.328 These fees are the functional equivalent of
payday loans in that a consumer pays a fee for taking money that they
do not have. 329 Overdraft protection and payday loans are already sub-
stitute goods. If banks offer a cheaper payday loan, it will result in the
loss of revenues from the decreased use of overdraft protection. While
banks may have legitimate concerns about appearing exploitative,
they should also be wary of the financial consequence of entering the
payday loan market-they may end up competing with themselves.
327. See Chessin, supra note 11, at 397-400 (describing the legislative process that led
to the 2000 Deferred Deposit Loan Act in Colorado, where the industry view was given
serious weight in deciding upon the final terms).
328. See BMR, supra note 100, at 12. Consumer advocates have already begun to turn
their attention to the high costs of overdraft fees. Barr, supra note 63, at 178.
329. BArn, supra note 100, at 4. The use of overdraft fees is addressed in Part IV supra.
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Banks will need to analyze whether their total revenues and profits will
increase or decrease if they enter the payday lending market.
Conclusion
While the payday lending industry has grown exponentially, it is
now under serious attack. The rhetoric grows harsher as more politi-
cians and media outlets realize that APRs are high, but the payday
lenders are right that prices are not the entire story. A real demand
exists for short-term credit. Payday lenders have responded by creat-
ing a product that people in financial emergencies simply cannot re-
pay on time. The problems with the current payday loan industry,
however, should not prohibit a low-income consumer from making
the same decisions about credit as high-income consumers. Consum-
ers simply need a product that gives them reasonable time to pay back
such a loan.
This Article offers one solution, asking reputable banks to offer
competing products. But not just any loan products-products that
are as convenient as current payday loans. The costs of the loans will
hopefully be lower, but not necessarily, because it is expensive to offer
short-term credit in small amounts. The products would be structured
to give consumers a realistic chance to repay on time, and they would
be convenient, to encourage people to use them. Payday loans have a
dirty reputation, but if they did not regularly drive people into further
debt, they could be useful for low-income consumers in a high-risk
world. We should not ban them, but change the supplier to compa-
nies that can offer reasonable products.
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